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ABSTRACT
Many policymakers remain blind to the moral implications of
environmental harm caused by government action (or inaction) and have
not adequately considered how criminal law deals with similar immoral
behavior in other contexts. Building from Lisa Heinzerling's thoughtprovoking essay Knowing Killing and Environmental Law, this article
considers the possibility of criminal culpability for environmental policy
decisions and the implications of that potential culpability for decisionmaking and communication. It builds from the premise that morality and
law universally condemn the knowing killing of other human beings. It
matters not that the identities of the dead are unknown. What matters
from the perspective of the criminal law is whether the actor causing
their deaths possessed the requisite level of mens rea. Thus, the lens of
the criminal law concept of intent can be used to examine the choices we,
as a society, make in designing environmental policy. This perspective
can be informed not only by the basic principles of criminal law but also
by recent developments in criminology, the law of corporate and
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. This article
has benefitted greatly from the feedback received at the Sabin Colloquium on Innovative
Environmental Law Scholarship at Columbia Law School. Many thanks are also due to

Richard Chen, Sarah Schindler, Jennifer Wriggins, and Jeffrey Maine for helpful
feedback on very early drafts. Any errors are mine alone.
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environmental crime, and relevant historical precedent. This article
makes the case that the criminal law mode of analysis could prove useful
to prosecutors and policymakers. Ultimately, the article will apply this
theoretical framework to environmental policy decisions currently
challenging local, state, and national governments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[W]e cannot fail to consider the effects on people's lives of
environmental deterioration, current models of development and the
throwaway culture. - Pope Francis
[T]aking a stand against climate change is a moral obligation.
President Barack Obama 2

1.

POPE FRANCIS, ENCYCLICAL LETTER LAUDATO SI' OF THE HOLY FATHER FRANCIS

ON CARE FOR OUR COMMON HOME para. 43 (2015), http://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/
francesco/pdf/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudatosien.pdf.
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Prosperity will mean little if we leave to future generations a world of
polluted air, toxic lakes and rivers, and vanished forests. - President
George W. Bush3

As prominent contemporary world leaders have acknowledged, the
government has a moral obligation to care for the environment. Many
have debated whether the fundamental source of that moral obligation is
the worth of humans or the independent worth of all living things, but,
regardless of whether non-human living things have independent moral
relevance, the effects of a deteriorating environment on human health
imbue any decision relating to it with at least some degree of moral
weight. This weight comes from a foundational premise of morality that
frowns upon the intentional taking of human life.4 And it matters not
whether that life is a named individual with whom the perpetrator is
well-acquainted' or some indeterminate person in a remote location. 6
Thus, at a minimum, immorality would seem to attach to actions that
affect the environment to such a degree that human beings are killed as a
result. Is the criminal law of our society meant to codify general
conceptions of morality? If so, should the general criminal law apply to
action (or inaction) that concerns the environment, at the very least when
that action results in the loss of human life?
An initial difficulty to answering these rhetorical inquiries arises
because actions affecting the environment on the scale necessary to
affect human lives are generally carried out not by individuals but by
corporate and government entities. The question of criminal culpability
for entities, rather than individual persons, has been a subject of
examination and debate for quite some time. In response, the law devised
the concepts of corporate personhood and vicarious liability, imposing

2.
Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks by the President in Announcing the
Clean Power Plan (Aug. 3, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/08/03/remarks-president-announcing-clean-power-plan.
3.
GRAYDON CARTER, WHAT WE'VE LosT 129 (2004) (quoting a campaign speech
by President George W. Bush).
4. See, e.g,, Exodus 20:13 ("Thou shalt not kill.").

5.

For example, in the 1990s, Lyle and Erik Menendez ("the Menendez brothers")

were famously charged with, and convicted of, the murders of their parents. See generally
DONALD A. DAVIS, BAD BLOOD: THE SHOCKING TRUE STORY BEHIND THE MENENDEZ

KILLINGS (1994).

6.

For example, from the 1970s to the 1990s, Theodore Kaczynski ("the

Unabomber") mailed homemade explosive devices to, among others, university and
airline officials, harming the recipients and many others at the locations where the bombs
detonated. The focus on universities and airlines garnered him the moniker
"Unabomber." He ultimately pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, among other
federal crimes, multiple counts of murder. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Famous
Cases and Criminals: Unabomber, FBI HISTORY, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-

cases/unabomber (last visited Jan. 8, 2018).
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criminal sanctions on corporations and their executive officers.7
However, with respect to environmental harms that result from a
combination of corporate and government action, positive law has not
yet created a functioning category of criminal culpability. This enduring
gap is not for want of theory or applicable law from closely related
contexts.
Criminologists have for years debated the contours of "state crime,"
questioning whether only violations of international law deserve such
designation or whether the term encompasses violations of domestic law,
human rights law, or even social norms.8 The emerging concept of
"Green Criminology" accounts for a "wide range of environmentallyrelated harms that exist in the world, especially compared to the [human
centered] criminal harms to which criminology has been limited." 9 Green
criminologists have embraced the synthesis concept of "state-corporate
crime," which essentially concerns itself with collusion and corruption
between corporate and government actors.10 Through application of
derivative frameworks, criminologists have argued that, inter alia, coal
industry regulations (or lack thereof)," oil spills, 12 and global warming

inaction1 3 constitute state-corporate crimes. One attorney has even
advanced these theoretical criminological arguments as a plea to the
United Nations to recognize "ecocide" as an international crime
alongside genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression.14
7. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 481
(1909) ("Congress can impute to a corporation the commission of certain criminal
offenses and subject it to criminal prosecution therefor.").
8. See DAWN L. ROTHE, STATE CRIMINALITY 4-6 (2009) (explaining the scholarly
debate over the standards that define state crime).
9.

MICHAEL J. LYNCH & PAUL B. STRETESKY, EXPLORING GREEN CRIMINOLOGY:

TOWARD A GREEN CRIMINOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 6 (2014); see also Michael A. Long et

al., Crime in the Coal Industry: Implicationsfor Green Criminology and Treadmill of
Production, 25 ORG. & ENV'T 328, 329 (2012) ("Green criminology has become a
rapidly expanding area of study within criminology,, promoting various green
criminological frameworks.").
10. See Michael J. Lynch et al., Global Warming and State-CorporateCrime: The
Politicalizationof Global Warming Under the Bush Administration, 54 CRIME L. & Soc.
CHANGE 213, 216 (2010).
11. See Long et al., supra note 9, at 338-41.
12. See Tricia Cruciotti & Rick A. Matthews, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, in STATECORPORATE CRIME: WRONGDOING AT THE INTERSECTION OF BusINEss & GOVERNMENT

149, 149-50 (Raymond J. Michalowski & Ronald C. Kramer eds., 2006) [hereinafter
STATE-CORPORATE CRIME).

13. See Lynch et al., supranote 10, at 216; see also Ronald C. Kramer & Raymond
J. Michalowski, Is Global Warming a State-Corporate Crime?, in CLIMATE CHANGE
FROM A CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 71, 71-72, 77-78 (Rob White ed., 2012).
14.
See POLLY HIGGINS, ERADICATING ECOCIDE: ExPOSING THE CORPORATE AND
POLITICAL PRACTICES DESTROYING THE PLANET AND PROPOSING THE LAWS NEEDED TO
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The law has not yet been explicitly extended quite so far as these
criminologists might want, but the idea of prosecuting entities for
collective decisions that impose increased risk of death upon members of
society is not as far-fetched as one might first imagine. In the 1970s, one
of the iconic American companies-Ford Motor Company-faced
criminal prosecution for the infamous design of the Pinto ("the Pinto
case").15 Ford was ultimately acquitted of the charges, which included
recklessly causing the deaths of three women. 16 The case illustrated the
importance of intent (i.e., mens rea) as the distinguishing element
between civil and criminal liability, and how a finding of criminal
culpability based on some degree of knowledge (in this case,
recklessness) could threaten to upend a tort system predicated on
balancing of risks. 17 The prominent tort scholar Richard Epstein cheered
the result and cautioned against the infiltration of the criminal law into
such risk management decision-making matters.18
Thirty years later, in a thought-provoking essay (and speech)
making a case against cost-benefit analysis, another prominent scholar,
Lisa Heinzerling, "defend[ed] the view that the moral commitment
against knowing killing should play a role in decisions about
environmental problems." 19 This article will serve as an extension of that
defense by specifically arguing for a role for criminal prosecution of
government entities in limited circumstances, and, perhaps more
importantly, for the use of criminal law concepts in the analysis of
environmental policy options and public engagement efforts. These
initial prescriptions recognize that though the lens of criminal culpability
will prove useful in many circumstances, actually holding a government
entity criminally accountable for its action (or inaction) presents
complications.20 Hence, this article will begin to outline the narrow
ERADICATE ECOCIDE 63 (2010) (defining ecocide as "the extensive destruction, damage to

or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether by human agency or by other causes,
to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory has been
severely diminished").
15. See Grand Jury Indictment, State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Ind. Super. Ct.
Sept. 13, 1978).
16. See Richard A. Epstein, Is Pinto a Criminal?, REG.: AEI J. oN Gov'T & Soc'Y,
Mar./Apr. 1980, at 15, 16.
17. Id. at 20 ("It cannot-should not-be the law that Ford may first be permitted
(if not required) to make certain cost-benefit calculations under the tort law, only then
and for that reason to be held guilty of reckless homicide under the criminal law.").
18. See id. at 20-21.
19. Lisa Heinzerling, Knowing Killing and EnvironmentalLaw, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 521, 521 (2006).
20. As scholars have noted, the Department of Justice charging other government
entities with crimes presents complications that should not be undertaken lightly. See
Stuart P. Green, The CriminalProsecution ofLocal Governments, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1197,
1215 n.107 (1994).
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circumstances under which actual criminal prosecution might be used
against a government entity as a tool of direct action.21 As others have
noted, the possibility of the Department of Justice charging another
agency or government entity with a crime is indeed real and may be
justified as a matter of policy. 2 2 Such a charge may not represent the best
option, but it is an available, and thus far underutilized, tool.
With advances in risk assessment and modeling technology, the
information available to policy and decision-makers has increased
exponentially in detail and accuracy. It is now possible to predict within
a reasonable degree of certainty the number of indeterminate persons
whose deaths would result (or be prevented) under each of a number of
possible decision scenarios.2 3 With the great power of such tools comes
the great moral (and legal) responsibility for the consequences of
decisions. While neither Professor Heinzerling nor this article advocate
for the prosecution through the criminal justice system of all government
and corporate actors whose decisions result in the loss of statistical lives,
society has reached a level of technological sophistication such that the
moral weight (and possible criminal culpability) of choosing among
policy options can no longer be ignored.
This insight comes at a time when social science is at an important
crossroads regarding policy communication. Professor Dan Kahan's
research has exposed the false assumption that many political
communicators operate on, which he calls the "Public Irrationality Thesis
(PIT)." 2 4 Kahan and his team's findings suggest that, despite what many
who espouse PIT believe, improving public access to, and understanding
of, scientific information is not likely to significantly increase support for

21. See infra Section V.A.
22. See Green, supra note 20, at 1215 n.107 (explaining that such a prosecution
would face some obvious objections and noting the existence of "problems inherent in
'self-prosecution"').
23. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE
FINAL
MERCURY
AND
AnR
Toxics
STANDARDS
5-10
(2011),
https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecasl/regdata/RIAs/matsriafmal.pdf. According to this report:
PC-based tools such as the environmental Benefits Mapping and Analysis
Program (BenMAP) can systematize health impact analyses by applying a
database of key input parameters, including health impact functions and
population projections. Analysts have applied the HIA approach to estimate
human health impacts resulting from hypothetical changes in pollutant
levels . . . . EPA and others have relied upon this method to predict future
changes in health impacts expected to result from the implementation of
regulations affecting air quality ....
Id. (citations omitted).
24. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Making Climate-Science Communication EvidenceBased-All the Way Down, in CULTURE, POLITICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 203, 205-07

(Maxwell Boykoff & Desarai Crow eds., 2014).
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environmental protection.2 5 Instead, Kahan and his team found support
for Kahan's "cultural cognition" thesis, which posits that individuals
form views on environmental risks and policies based on how those
views connect them to others who share their cultural values. 2 6
Combatting crime relates differently to the shared cultural values of most
groups than does environmental protection.27 Thus, by refraining bad
environmental actions as potential crimes, policy communicators might
reach new and unexpected groups.
As initially highlighted, there can be no discussion of this topic if
criminal culpability can only attach to an individual and not an entity.
Therefore, Part II will first examine how the criminal law and
criminologists have handled the issue of personhood with respect to
corporate and government entities.28 Next, this Part will address the
legitimacy of a defense available to governments, but not corporationssovereign immunity. 29 Part III will explain the various levels of intent
recognized by criminal law and how those levels of intent translate to
entity liability. 3 0 It will debate the relative merits of charging individuals
versus charging entities, and will provide examples, including a
31
discussion of the Flint, Michigan water crisis prosecution as a test case.
Part IV will lay out the implications of the previously discussed
principles of criminal intent in the context of pervasive and accurate
32
environmental information. Part V will provide the beginnings of
frameworks for how prosecutors and policymakers might make use of
the criminal liability perspective.33 Part VI will apply the lens of
potential criminal liability to pressing contemporary decisions of
environmental policy around climate change, air pollution, and the water
crisis in Flint. 34

See id; see also Dan M. Kahan et al., The PolarizingImpact ofScience Literacy
25.
and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 732,

734-35 (2012).
26.

See Dan M. Kahan, Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory

of Risk, in 2 HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY: EPISTEMOLOGY, DECISION THEORY, ETHICS,
AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF RISK 725, 730 (Sabine Roeser, Rafaela Hillerbrand, Per

Sandin & Martin Peterson eds., 2012).
27. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, CulturalCognition and Public Policy, 24
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 163 (2006) ("Our cultural worldview scales were much
stronger predictors of opinions on environmental issues, crime control issues, and
economic regulatory issues than were ideological and party affiliation measures.").
28. See infra Section II.A.
29. See infra Section II.B.
30. See infra Section IIIA.
31. See infra Sections III.B-.D.
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See infra Part V.
34. See infra Part VI.
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1I. STATE AND CORPORATE PERSONHOOD AND CRIMINALITY

Criminal liability for government entities begins with the question
of entity liability more broadly, which sets the stage for later discussion
of the similarities and differences between corporate and government
entities. The important principles that allow for corporate criminal
liability apply with equal force to government bodies. Though
differences exist in the purposes, nature, and operation of corporate and
government entities, this Part will demonstrate why these distinctions do
not change the application of the criminal law, except, perhaps, with
respect to the potential availability of the sovereign immunity defense.
A.

Of Governments, Corporations,and People

The United States justice system has for many years recognized that
corporations (i.e., groups of individuals formally organized to enjoy
certain legal protections) should not be immune from criminal
prosecution.35 Corporations consist of individuals who themselves might
commit crimes, but also have the potential to commit criminal acts
collectively. That underlying rationale comes easily. However, the
practical difficulties of corporate criminal liability persist. While
acknowledging that the corporation can be the most responsible (in other
words, culpable) actor,36 and thereby be subject to fines, the law also
makes imprisonment of "responsible corporate officer[s]" available. In
recent years, the Supreme Court has signaled an increasing willingness to
recognize corporate personhood for the purposes of various kinds of
legal protections and obligations. And after an era marked by deferred
prosecutions, the federal government in 2014 and 2015 initiated historic
prosecutions against a number of large banking corporations, including
Credit Suisse, JP Morgan Chase, Citicorp, and Barclays.
Despite its treatment of corporate entities, the law has not yet
expanded to accommodate criminal liability for the most important type
of government entity (i.e., the state itself), except in rare circumstances.
International law criminalizes certain, particularly egregious, state
35.

See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,

494-96 (1909).
36. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943) (finding that, under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, a corporation may commit the offense, but
individual officers who aid and abet its commission could, depending on the evidence, be
equally guilty).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 531, 534 (4th Cir. 2001).
38. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (recognizing
corporate personhood for purpose of free speech protection).
39. David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering CorporateCriminal
Prosecution,49 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1235, 1238 (2016).
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conduct, 4 0 but for actions that do not rise to the level of direct violations
of international obligations (e.g., treaty provisions), the criminal justice
system provides little recourse against the state.
Setting aside the defense of sovereign immunity as a significant
practical difference between government and corporate entity liability,4 1
from the perspective of criminological theory, once one embraces the
idea that entities, like the individuals that comprise them, can have rights,
obligations, and mental states that subject them to criminal law, it is
difficult to explain how the state does not qualify as such an actor.
Indeed, criminologists developed the theories of state and corporate
criminality somewhat in concert.42 Since that time there has been much
quibbling over the definitional contours of state crime, but it is now
widely acknowledged as a legitimate concept and field of study. Though
no one universal definition prevails, a coherent synthesis definition
describes state crime as "[a]ny action that violates international public
law and/or a state's own domestic law when these actions are committed
by individual actors acting on behalf of, or in the name of the state, even
when such acts are motivated by their personal economic, political, and
ideological interests."43 Among the potential types of state crime are
"state-corporate crime, crimes of globalization, political crime, and
environmental crime."" These categories encompass "actions that are
immoral or unethical and which exist at the edge of crime, involving
actions that violate the spirit of governance." 45
"State-corporate crime" describes the situation where a public entity
coordinates with one or more private entities to accomplish a common

40. See ROTHE, supra note 8, at 3 (tracing criminal liability for states back to the
mid-1900s).
41. See infra Section 1I.B.
42. See ROTHE, supra note 8, at 12.
43. Id. at 6.
44. Id at 12. "Environmental crime," as the term is used in the study of state
criminology, refers to intentional harm to the environment, not necessarily harm to
persons by way of harm to the environment. See id at 24. Criminality in this context
derives from the violation of international treaties that prohibit certain actions, such as
trade in endangered species or dumping of toxic waste at sea. See id at 25. So defined,
this concept has less utility for the purposes of this work, because it does not implicate
most of the environmental policy decisions currently being debated in the United States
and it lacks the moral weight of intentional killing. State environmental crime thus
supports the analysis in much the same way that corporate environmental crime does-it
provides evidence that entity criminal liability is possible in the environmental law
context.
45. Lynch et al., supra note 10, at 215-16.
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objective through cooperative illegal activity. 46 Specifically,
corporate crime is defined as:

state-

[I]llegal or socially injurious actions that result from a mutually
reinforcing interaction between (1) policies and/or practices in pursuit
of the goals of one or more institutions of political governance and (2)
policies and/or practices in pursuit of the goals of one or more
institutions of economic production and distribution.47
This concept lacks the breadth to address all of the harm-generating
activity discussed herein, but goes notably further than the criminal law,
as presently enforced, does. It acknowledges an important reality: in

terms of moral agency, there is no meaningful distinction between
groups of people based on the common purpose for which they are
organized, be it governance, the generation of profit, or some other
shared objective. What matters from an entity culpability standpoint is
simply that a group of people are organized for a common purpose such
that the entity itself functions as a social actor.48 Both government
agencies and corporations act under the auspices of such organizing
principles, and society attributes the success, or failure, of said actions to
the entity, more than any of the individuals who comprise it. The relative
dearth of positive criminal law proscribing the activity of government
entities formally perpetuates a distinction between types of entities, but
any basis for the different treatment of government entities does not have
its roots in the moral philosophy that underpins our criminal law. And
since it is that moral underpinning that makes the criminal law relevant
to environmental decision-making, there is no reason for excluding the
decisions of government entities from scrutiny.
B. The Sovereign Elephant in the Room
It is important to pause here and briefly discuss what is meant by
"the state" and how different levels of government (and their constituent
parts) enjoy (or do not enjoy) the protection of sovereign immunity.
Historically, local governments (including, but not limited to, "cities,
46. Kramer & Michalowski, supra note 13, at 76; Rob White & Ronald C. Kramer,
Critical Criminology and the Struggle Against Climate Change Ecocide, 23 CRITICAL
CRIMINOLOGY

47.

383, 383 (2015).

Raymond Michalowski & Ronald Kramer, The Critique of Power, in STATECORPORATE CRIME, supra note 12, at 1, 15.
48. See ROTHE, supra note 8, at 3; see also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 865 (1992)
("[A]scribing purposes to groups and institutions is a complex business, and one that is
often difficult to describe abstractly. But that fact does not make such ascriptions
improper. In practice, we ascribe purposes to group activities all the time without many
practical difficulties.").
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municipal corporations, towns, boroughs, counties, townships, and
parishes'A 9) were subject to prosecution under the laws of the state where
they existed and under the federal law.so The Supreme Court in City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.51 introduced uncertainty into the question
of local governments' potential immunity from prosecution.52 However,
that case pertained to immunity from punitive damages in a private civil
suit, and thus the door to criminal prosecution technically remains
open-at least to the extent that the Supreme Court has not closed it. 5 3
Consequently, federal and state prosecutors could indict local
governments, or parts thereof, for the actions described in this article.5 4
But the power to indict does not seem to work both ways. In contrast to
municipalities, federal and state governments theoretically enjoy the
protection of sovereign immunity, especially from prosecutions initiated
by local (non-federal) officials. 5 Because the crimes against human lives
theorized herein implicate federal agencies, and to a lesser extent state
49. Green, supra note 20, at 1201 (describing this state of affairs as existing "[flor
more than a century and a half, from about 1819 until as late as 1975").
50. Id.
51. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
52. Id. at 263. According to the Supreme Court in City ofNewport:
In general, courts viewed punitive damages as contrary to sound public policy,
because such awards would burden the very taxpayers and citizens for whose
benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised. The courts readily distinguished
between liability to compensate for injuries inflicted by a municipality's
officers and agents, and vindictive damages appropriate as punishment for the
bad-faith conduct of those same officers and agents. Compensation was an
obligation properly shared by the municipality itself, whereas punishment
properly applied only to the actual wrongdoers. The courts thus protected the
public from unjust punishment, and the municipalities from undue fiscal
constraints.
Id. In the wake of City ofNewport, some courts determined that local governments were
incapable of forming mens rea, and thus immune from prosecution. See Green, supra
note 20, at 1223-24. Prior to that time, some courts had held that municipalities were
immune from prosecution when they were acting in a "governmental capacity" and were
not immune when acting in a "proprietary capacity." See id. at 1209. This distinction was
ultimately abandoned as unworkable, with the usual solution being in favor of subjecting
local governments to prosecution in all capacities. Id. at 1229.
53. See Green, supra note 20, at 1199 (arguing that when "local governments and
their agencies intentionally adopt policies that authorize, encourage, or condone acts that
are properly treated as criminal under federal law, those entities (rather than, or in
addition to, the officials who work for them) can and, in some cases, should be criminally
prosecuted"); id. at 1226 ("City of Newport and the RICO cases all involved immunity
from damage actions brought by private plaintiffs. Such cases say little about immunity
from criminal prosecutions brought by the federal government.").
54. See infra Section VI.C.
55. See, e.g., People v. Walters, 751 F.2d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming
dismissal of criminal prosecution brought by City of Los Angeles against Veterans
Administration in connection with the alleged disposal of hazardous medical wastes, on
the grounds that there was no clear and unambiguous evidence that the federal
government had waived its sovereign immunity to criminal sanctions).
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agencies, more regularly than local governments,S6 it is imperative to
understand the hurdle to prosecution that sovereign immunity potentially
presents. It would undoubtedly be the first, and most powerful, line of
defense employed by legal representation for the defendant agency if any
such charges were filed.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has its roots in English
common law and the maxim "the king can do no wrong."57 In the United
States, according to the revered Hart and Wechsler text, "[t]he doctrine
developed largely in dicta, reflecting evidently a general professional
opinion" that the government should not prosecute itself.58 Over the
years, the Supreme Court set out the conditions under which sovereign
immunity provided a defense: where the prosecution is actually against
the sovereign itself (rather than an individual or non-government entity)
and seeks a remedy that would require the sovereign to act affirmatively
to stop the harm that provides the basis for the charge.5 9 Hence, in most
instances, sovereign immunity protects federal and state government
entities from prosecution unless Congress or a state legislature has
provided an explicit waiver.
In the context of environmental crimes, some limited explicit
waivers exist, though, in light of the courts' treatment of those waivers,
none likely sweep broadly enough to cover the type of general
manslaughter charges proposed herein. In fact, Congress has provided a
waiver of sovereign immunity in each of the major environmental
statutes, authorizing civil fines and criminal prosecution against federal
facilities that illegally pollute the environment. 60 Utilizing these waivers,
56. See Jonathan H. Adler, JursidictionalMismatch in Environmental Federalism,
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 169 (2005) (describing "extensive federal involvement in
areas best left in state or local hands"); Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change
Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global
Problem and What Does This Say about Federalism and Environmental Law, 38 URB.
LAW. 1015, 1015 (2006) (describing "modem environmental law" as "federal
environmental statutes and their implementation and enforcement by federal agencies,"
while noting that "the common law has a role--especially common law nuisance
actions-and states are important players in interpreting, applying, enforcing, and
regulating beyond the scope of federal law").
57. Rebecca Heintz, Note, Federal Sovereign Immunity and Clean Water: A
Supreme Misstep, 24 ENVTL. L. 263, 266 (1994) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 238-39 (1st ed. 1765-1769)).
58. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURT AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1339 (2d ed. 1973).
59. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (determining that sovereign immunity
attached when "the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or
domain, or interfere with the public administration" (quoting Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S.
731, 738 (1947)); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687-89
(1949).
60. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6961(a), 7418(a), 9620(a)(1)
(2012); see also J.B. Wolverton, Sovereign Immunity and NationalPriorities:Enforcing
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state attorneys general have been able to assess penalties against the
federal government for violating environmental statutes at federal
facilities.6 1 However, courts have been inclined to read these explicit
waivers very narrowly. 6 2 Accordingly, it is unlikely that a court, state or
federal, would interpret the statutory waivers of sovereign immunity for
specific violations of environmental laws to permit prosecution of federal
government entities for general crimes like murder, manslaughter, or
negligent homicide.
There is nonetheless some reason to think that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity would not stand up to scrutiny in the face of public
outcry over governmental crimes. Many commentators have questioned
the legitimacy or utility of the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
particularly as it might apply to crimes committed by the government
itself.63 Put bluntly, no government should be above the law. 6 4 Modern
commentators and current events have forced the acknowledgment that
the government, though responsible for administering justice, is just as
capable as a private actor of committing acts of injustice.6 ' But the idea
that the concept of sovereign immunity runs counter to our system of
government is by no means new. In the 1970s, calls for the abandonment
of the doctrine from the legal academy astutely pointed out that an
inability to hold the government accountable for violations of law

Federal Facilities'Compliance with Environmental Statutes, 15 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv.
565, 577 (1991) (describing the waivers as consistent with the theory of moral
responsibility on the part of the government for actions that violate its own laws).
61. See, e.g., Ohio v. Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1990)
(determining for the first time, at the federal appellate court level, that states could assess
penalties against polluting federal facilities under the federal facilities provision of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323).
62. See id. at 1063 (declining to hold that penalties were available to states under
the federal facilities provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); see also
Wolverton, supra note 60, at 574-76 ("[T]he Justice Department does not construe the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's waiver of immunity to encompass
administrative orders or criminal sanctions.").
63. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L.
REv. 1201 (2001); Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty,
Immunity, and JudicialIndependence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 521 (2003); John F.
Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading ofPreciseConstitutionalTexts, 113
YALE L.J. 1663 (2004); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition:
Toward a FirstAmendment Right to PursueJudicialClaims Against the Government, 91
Nw. U. L. REv. 899 (1997); Stacy Humes-Schulz, Note, Limiting Sovereign Immunity in
the Age ofHuman Rights, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 105 (2008).

64. See Heintz, supra note 57, at 272 ("It cannot be seriously asserted that the
federal government, as it exists today, should have the privilege of being above the
law.").
See Wolverton, supra note 60, at 577; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 63, at
65.
1213-14.
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undermines the rule of law itself.66 One of the most prominent
constitutional scholars of our day has even gone so far as to suggest that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity may be unconstitutional.67
The Supreme Court itself has struggled with the effectiveness of the
doctrine as a defense to government malfeasance, repeatedly questioning.
and criticizing sovereign immunity's historical and logical roots. Justice
Frankfurter notably remarked that the doctrine "undoubtedly runs
counter to modern democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the
State."68 Before him, in his famous Olmstead v. United States69 dissent,
Justice Brandeis argued that the federal government should not be able to
violate the criminal laws of the states with impunity. 70 Indeed, as early as
Marbury v. Madison,71 in the Supreme Court's formative years, the
Justices stressed the importance of providing a remedy for the
government's violation of law, explicitly referencing the English
procedures for seeking recourse against the King.72
Put simply:
At a time when government departments and many independent
corporations, directly 'or indirectly controlled by the government,
assume an increasing variety of functions and responsibilities in the
social and economic life of nations, the exemption of either government
or government corporations from criminal liability generally is neither
morally nor technically justified.73
A brief analysis of the justifications for and application of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity supports this contention.
66. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REV.
383, 384 (1970) ("To improve substantive justice, to enforce procedural justice, and to
allocate functions efficiently, Congress should abolish nearly all of what is left of
sovereign immunity.").
67. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 63.
68. Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
69. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
70. See id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy.").
71. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
72. See id. at 163. According to the Court in Marbury:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury.... In Great Britain the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a
petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court. . . . The
government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of
laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.
Id.
73. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SocIETY 211 (2d ed. 1972).
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Modem defenders of sovereign immunity justify its continued
legitimacy on two general grounds: (1) the government cannot sue itself
("the unitary executive" theory) and (2) the government should not be
subject to the indignity and undue influence of prosecution.74 As to the
former justification, the Department of Justice has officially embraced
the unitary executive theory and maintained that it cannot prosecute other
branches of the federal government.75 The Supreme Court, however, has
never officially endorsed this theory.76 The Supreme Court has actually
declined to give weight to the Department of Justice's view, finding that
the "Take Care" Clause of the Constitution77 did not empower the
executive branch to prohibit enforcement of the law against itself.78 The
statements of the Justices described above concerning the necessity to the
rule of law of holding violators accountable, regardless of connection to
the government, suggest that the Supreme Court would have some
difficulty embracing the unitary executive theory. As to the justification
that sovereign immunity insulates the government from the indignity of
prosecution and the influence of prosecutors and courts, history suggests
that this concern has not consistently weighed on the minds of judges
applying the doctrine.79
Thus, if a court were confronted with an indictment charging a
federal or state agency with implementing environmental policy in a
criminally culpable way, there exists some real question as to whether
sovereign immunity could effectively be wielded as a defense. The
political treatment of violations of environmental law by federal
government entities gives some additional weight to the idea that
sovereign immunity would not provide an acceptable defense. For
example, when the scope of the waivers in federal environmental statutes
was still up for debate, President Bush gave a campaign speech in which
he stated, "[u]nfortunately, some of the worst [environmental] offenders
are our own federal facilities. As President, I will insist that in the future
federal agencies meet or exceed environmental standards. The
74.

See Heintz, supra note 57, at 265, 272, 281.

75. Id. at 281 (citing Mark J. Conner, Government Owned-Contractor Operated
Munitions Facilities: Are They Appropriate in the Age of Strict Environmental
Compliance andLiability?, 131 MIL. L. REv. 1, 22 (1991)).
76. Wolverton, supra note 60, at 570. But see Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S.
349, 353 (1907) ("A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.").
77. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed .... .").
78. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 610 (1838) ("[D]uty
and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not the
direction of the President.").
79. Heintz, supra note 57, at 265.
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government should live within the laws it imposes on others."so The
criminal code constitutes perhaps the most important set of such laws.
Furthermore, the current prevailing thinking-wherein government
officials, protected only by qualified immunity,81 can be subject to
prosecution for their individual actions,82 while the entity they work for
enjoys complete immunity-creates some problems of its own. Without
immunity for government entities, "[t]he question of whether the agency,
the government official, or both, should be criminally liable mirrors the
question of whether, in corporate liability, a corporation or the
responsible employee should be liable."83 However, immunity makes
that analysis irrelevant, and thus incentivizes prosecution of individuals
in the government rather than the entities they represent, even when
those entities are in fact culpable. This system disproportionately
punishes government workers, and disincentives participation in
government. Perhaps worse, it can leave victims without an acceptable
remedy and perpetuate an injustice indefinitely. 84 In current practice,
government officials, particularly in administrative agencies, are given
wide breadth in their official mandates and significant deference by the
courts, shielding them from personal liability;8 5 hence, the negative

incentives to government service have had little observed effect, but the
absence of recourse to those harmed by the government persists. 6 If this
enforcement gap prompts action against individuals, prosecutors and

80. Wolverton, supra note 60, at 587 (quoting Rochelle L. Stanfield, It's Hip to Be
Clean, 20 NAT'L J. 1510, 1510 (1988)) ("Virtually all parties agree in theory that federal
facilities should be accountable for pollution in the same degree as private parties.").
81. For a fuller account of the contours and limits of immunity for government
officials charged with crimes, see generally Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison,
What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy
Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195 (2003).
82. Of course, outside the realm of criminal prosecution, suits against government
officials seeking injunctive relief from enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state
law are not barred by sovereign immunity. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56
(1908).
83. Michael G. Faure, Ingeborg M. Koopmans & Johannes C. Oudijk, Imposing
Criminal Liability on Government Officials Under Environmental Law: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 529, 563 (1996).
84.
Cf id. at 534 (describing the "major difference [that] exists between the duties
that government officials and private individuals owe" and pointing out that "personal
liability may paralyze the initiative of government officials" and can be "unfair, as is
imposing a duty to indemnify tort victims from the official's personal resources").
85. For a counter-example, see Germany, where the "Criminal Code does not
specifically hold government officials criminally liable for failing to execute their duties
in environmental protection, [but] such a failure may constitute an environmental crime."
See id. at 538.
86. See id. at 546 ("In view of the deference criminal courts give to the official's
discretionary powers, the extent of liability to which officials are presently exposed is not
great enough to cause the suggested counterproductive effects.").
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executive branch officials will ultimately have to confront the question of
government entity liability as well.
III. INTENT IN CRIMINAL LAW

Having answered in the affirmative the foundational query of
whether or not the criminal law even applies to government entities, this
Part turns to the details of how the intent element of a crime can be
satisfied by actors other than individual persons. Embedded within this
analysis is the intuition that proving the state of mind of an individual is
easier than proving the state of mind of a collective (i.e., an organization
of any kind). This intuition has manifested in a philosophical and
political debate about whether to charge individuals, entities, or both. It
has also borne out in practice, with many individuals ultimately taking
the brunt of criminal punishment for environmental harms (in the
relatively rare instances in which such harms are prosecuted).
A.

The Many Faces of CriminalIntent

The assumed universal ethical principle at the heart of this article is
that the intentional taking of another human life is wrong. This principle
provides the basis for the criminal law of murder and manslaughter,
among other related crimes, across the United States. 87 The criminal law
attaches culpability to the taking of another life based upon the level of
intention (mens rea) with which said life is taken. The Model Penal Code
sets out four different levels of mens rea: purpose, 8 knowledge, 89
recklessness, 90 and negligence. 91 With respect to the taking of human
life, the crimes that correspond to each level of intention go by varying
names in different states-with intentional or knowing killing generally
referred to as murder or homicide in the first and second degree, and
87. Cf Morris R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987,
992-94 (1940) (explaining how moral intuition is often cited as the basis for criminal
law, particularly by Kant).
88. A person acts purposefully (intentionally) if he acts with the intent that his
action cause a certain result. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
In other words, the defendant undertakes his action either intending for, or hoping that, a
certain result will follow. Id.
89. A person acts knowingly if he is aware that his conduct will result in certain
consequences. See id. § 2.02(2)(b). In other words, a person acts knowingly if he is aware
that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause a specific result. See id.
90. A person acts recklessly if he is aware of a substantial risk that a certain result
will occur as a result of his actions. See id. § 2.02(2)(c). The risk must be substantial
enough that the action represents a gross deviation from what a reasonable law-abiding
person would do. Id.
91. A person acts negligently if he should have been aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that a certain consequence would result from his actions. See id.
§ 2.02(2)(d).
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reckless or negligent action resulting in death generally referred to as
negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter. The Model Penal
Code9 2 takes a slightly different approach, classifying as murder any
killing committed purposefully or knowingly, 93 classifying as
manslaughter any killing resulting from recklessness, 9 4 and classifying as
negligent homicide any killing resulting from negligence. Because it
would be quite difficult to show that an entity acted purposefully,96 this
article focuses on the latter three levels of intent-knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence.
A murder conviction based on a mens rea of knowledge would
require that the defendant (individual or entity) take an action while
aware that said action would result in the death of a human being. 97 A
manslaughter, or negligent homicide, conviction would only require that
the entity know that the action created a substantial risk of the death of a
human being. 9 8 It seems quite plausible that an entity could have
92. The Model Penal Code is not itself a governing law. It is instead a model text
authored
by
a group of judges, lawyers, and legal scholars
at
the American Law Institute (ALI) meant to assist with the organization and
standardization of criminal law in the various states. Many states have adopted parts of
the Model Penal Code. See ALI, Model Penal Code, https://www.ali.org/publications/
show/model-penal-code/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2018).
93. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(l)(a). This Section of the Model Penal Code
also includes homicide committed "recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life." Id. § 210.2(l)(b).
94. Id. § 210.3.
95. Id. § 210.4.
96. To prove imputed knowledge, one can rely on objective evidence of the records
and information retained by the entity and by its employees. See Mihailis E. Diamantis,
Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2049, 2070 (2016) ("Since all
knowledge is true, different things known by different employees can never conflict. The
process of aggregating their knowledge to attribute to the corporation is easy-just take
the conjunction of all the things known by employees and say the corporation knows it
all."). However, to prove imputed purpose, one would almost certainly have to rely on
testimonial evidence concerning employees' motivations to demonstrate that the entity
itself desired a particular result, which is a more dubious proposition for a jury to
embrace. See id. ("Consider crimes where mens rea turns on the beliefs (rather than the
knowledge) of the defendant. Beliefs, of course, can be false, as in the classic hombook
case of the would-be murderer who shoots a corpse.").
97. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) ("[I]f the element involves a result of
his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a
result.").
98. See id. § 2.02(2)(c). According to this Section of the Model Penal Code:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and
the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation.
Id.; see also id. § 2.02(2)(d). Section 2.02(2)(d) of the Model Penal Code states:
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constructive knowledge of deaths resulting from its actions, or at least of
the substantial risk of their occurrence. Indeed, that was precisely the
theory motivating the prosecutor's decision to charge Ford Motor
Company in the Pinto case. 99 That case stemmed from an August 10,
1978 rear-end collision with a Ford Pinto that burst into flames
(allegedly due to the placement of the gas tank), resulting in the deaths of
the three young women occupants.'"u Ford was accused in the media, and
in court, of having been aware that the placement of the gas tank would
result in death by fire in rear-end collision incidents.' 01 The indictment
thus included a count alleging that Ford "did through the acts and
omissions of its agents and employees ... recklessly cause the death of
[three women]."10 2 The prosecutor, and the grand jury, clearly believed
that Ford, a corporation, could possess the requisite mens rea to commit
manslaughter based on the risk information available to its engineers
when the Pinto was designed.1 03
Though few prosecutors have been so brazen as to bring general
murder or manslaughter charges, there exists significant precedent for
finding corporations capable of possessing the requisite level of mens rea
for criminal culpability under more specific criminal prohibitions, such
as environmental laws. For example, in United States v. Dotterweich,1 04
the Supreme Court, in finding that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act imposed strict criminal liability on corporate officers based on their
opportunity to inform themselves, acknowledged that the "person"
ultimately responsible for the crime could also be the corporation
itself.'os Department of Justice policy has comported with the Supreme
Court's view that the corporation itself, in addition to its executives, can
be held criminally responsible for malfeasance.106
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when
he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and
purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in
the actor's situation.
Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
99. See Epstein, supra note 16, at 15; supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
100. Epstein, supra note 16, at 15.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
105. Id. at 284-85.
106. See, e.g., Larry D. Thompson, U.S. Deputy Attorney Gen., Memorandum to
Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys on Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations 1 (2003), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20jgrivwaiv dojthomp.auth
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* Indeed, one of the most widely publicized corporate prosecutions in
recent years came in the environmental context. In 2016, the Department
of Justice charged automaker Volkswagen . with a number of crimes
related to alleged deception about the emissions performance of its diesel
vehicles.10 7 The Third Superseding Information made out a violation of
the federal conspiracy statute 0 8 on a number of grounds.1 09 According to
the Information:
Volkswagen . .

willfully, knowingly, and deliberately combine[d],

conspire[d], and confederate[d] and did agree to:

c. violate the Clean Air Act, by making and causing to be made, false
material statements, representations, and certifications in, and omitting
and causing to be omitted material information from, notices,
applications, records, reports, plans, and other documents required
pursuant to the Clean Air Act to be filed or maintained, in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2)(A)." 0

This charge is consistent with the Department of Justice's view that
corporations can act knowingly and intentionally. Indeed, Volkswagen
ultimately pleaded guilty to similar charges as part of deal with
prosecutors."' This case presents the most recent prominent example of
the law and society's willingness to find entities capable of mens rea and

hold them criminally accountable for environmental crimes.
The legal history of corporate mens rea lends supports to the
conclusion that, at its logical core, the law of intent treats government
entities similarly. In the Reconstruction Era, when civil rights statutes

came into being, municipalities (i.e., government corporations) were, as a
matter of law, incapable of forming malicious intent and therefore
effectively enjoyed immunity from prosecution.'12 However, business

corporations were also regarded as incapable of forming malicious
intent-the law acknowledged no distinction.11 3 In other words, it was
not the public nature of the entity that allegedly made a municipality
heckdam.pdf ("In all cases involving wrongdoing by corporate agents, prosecutors should
consider the corporation, as well as the responsible individuals, as potential criminal
targets.").
107. See generally Third Superseding Information, United States v. Volkswagen, No.
2:16-cr-20394 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 11, 2017).
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012)..
109. See Third Superseding Information, supra note 107, at 6-9.
110. Id. at 6-7.

111. See Judgment at 1, United States v. Volkswagen, No. 2:16-cr-20394 (E.D.
Mich. Apr. 21, 2017).
112.
113.

Green, supra note 20, at 1222-24.
Id. at 1224.
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incapable of forming the requisite mens rea, but rather simply the fact
that corporations (at that time) were not "people" in the eyes of the law.
Things have changed, and the law has evolved, recognizing that
corporations can manifest intent through the conduct of their agents and
employees.1 14 Thus, as a matter of law, a government corporation now is
considered capable of forming criminal intent."' The failure to prosecute
government entities cannot fairly be attributed to a rule of law
concerning the formation of intent. Indeed, "[o]utside the criminal law,
intentions, motives, and other mental states are regularly attributed to
government entities."ll 6 It must be attributed to some other prudential
concerns that distinguish a private corporation from a governmental
one.117

One such prudential concern is what one might call "reverse
imputed liability." In other words, if a government entity, particularly in
a democratic society, were found to have malicious intent, would the
citizens whom that entity represents technically harbor that intent as
well? As a matter of law, there is no question that imputed intent fails to
operate that way." 8 This concern is thus a political one about the

114.

See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-

95 (1909). According to the Court:
[T]here is a large class of offenses ...

wherein the crime consists in purposely

doing the things prohibited by statute. In that class of crimes we see no good
reason why corporations may not be held responsible for and charged with the
knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting within the authority conferred
upon them. If it were not so, many offenses might go unpunished and acts be
committed in violation of law, where, as in the present case, the statute requires
all persons, corporate or private, to refrain from certain practices forbidden in

the interest of public policy.
Id. (citations omitted).
115.
See Green, supra note 20, at 1202 ("[T]he definition of what was 'criminal' for
municipalities was derived (like much of local government law) from the more general

law of corporations."); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (2012) (defining "person" to
include

municipalities,

government

corporations,

or

political

subdivisions,

instrumentalities, and agencies of a state); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(5), 1402(e) (2012) (same);
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f(12), 6903(15), 7602(e), 9601(21), 11049(7) (2012) (same). Some
statutes also define "person" to include interstate bodies, federal agencies, and the federal
government itself. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300f(12) (federal agencies); id § 6903(15)
(interstate bodies); id. § 7602(e) (departments or instrumentalities of the United States);
id. § 9601(21) (United States government); id. § 11049(7) (interstate bodies).
116.

Green, supra note 20, at 1225.

117. See id. at 1203 (citing State v. City of Portland, 74 Me. 268, 273 (1883) ("Cases
involving the criminal liability of business corporations were regularly cited as support in
decisions and scholarly treatises involving the criminal liability of local governments and
vice versa.").
118.
Imputation involves attributing the acts or knowledge of an agent to a principal;
in corporate criminal law, the corporation is the principal and its employees are the
agents. See Michael E. Tigar, It Does the Crime But Not the Time: Corporate Criminal
Liability in Federal Law, 17 AM. J. CRiM. L. 211, 221 (1990) (explaining how actions,
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implications of conviction. For instance, would citizens of a municipality
convicted of a crime of malice unjustly suffer some collateral
consequences (i.e., punishment), perhaps in the form of shaming or
economic hardship at the hands of citizens of other communities? Real
debate could be had about the answer to that question. 19 However, it is a
question that should weigh in the mind of a prosecutor making a
charging decision, 12 0 not a threshold question as to whether criminal
prosecution is legally available as a tool to remedy a wrong committed at
the hands of the government.
Another distinguishing feature of government entities that raises
questions about their ability to possess criminal intent is that they are
ostensibly organized for, and make decisions on the basis of, the public
good. 12 1 Private corporations primarily serve the interests of investors, or
a small subset of the population. The mission of government entities to
benefit all of their constituents, one might argue, imputes all policy
decisions with a utilitarian intent-the greatest good for the greatest
number. In other words, some citizens will suffer as a result of policy
decisions, but it is expected, indeed it is crucial, that those losses occur
so that more citizens can gain. To criminalize the loss-generating side of
the conduct that comprises such utilitarian tradeoffs would undermine
the mission of serving the public-or so the argument goes. But, the
criminal law already at least partially accounts for such situations
through the availability of affirmative defenses-namely, the defense of
necessity.122 Necessity provides a defense when one's otherwise criminal
act actually provides the only feasible means of preventing a greater
knowledge, and intent are imputed from employees to the "legal fiction" of a
corporation).
119. See, e.g., Albanese v. City Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 710 F. Supp. 563, 567
(D.N.J. 1989) (declining to attribute criminal intent to a municipal corporation "because
the retribution for such a wrong should not 'be visited upon the shoulders of blameless or
unknowing taxpayers' (quoting City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,
267 (1981))).
120. See infra Section V.A.
121. See Faure et al., supra note 83, at 534 ("An official acts for the public interest
and the community profits from his actions; a private individual acts for his own interest
and solely derives the benefits of his actions.").
122. See generally Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Application of Defense of Necessity
to Murder, 23 A.L.R. 7th Art. 1 (2017). This annotation indicates:
Under the force of extreme circumstances, conduct which would otherwise
constitute a crime is justifiable and not criminal; the actor engages in the
conduct out of necessity to prevent a greater harm from occurring. The
necessity defense addresses the dilemma created when physical forces beyond
an actor's control render his or her illegal conduct the lesser of two evils and
excuses criminal actions taken in response to exigent circumstances. It is based
on the premise that illegal action should not be punished if it was undertaken to
prevent a greater harm.
Id. § 2 (citation omitted).
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harm-a description that could encompass regulatory risk-benefit
tradeoffs. Admittedly, the defense of necessity has been interpreted and
applied narrowly. 12 3 So, if one is troubled by the potential for
governmental criminal liability for risk-benefit tradeoffs that
significantly benefit society, a more relaxed application of the defense of
necessity presents an adequate and logically consistent solution-much
more elegant than simply excluding the government from the application
of criminal law. Moreover, the historical record concerning the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion suggests that any concern about the
prosecution for truly beneficial policy decisions is likely more imagined
than real.1 2 4
B.

Whether Responsibility Falls on an Entity or an Individual and
the Implicationsfor Tort Law

Despite the established law on corporate mens rea, studies have
found that only about 30 percent of indictments for federal
environmental crimes in a representative sample were against
corporations, and of those corporations convicted of crimes, 70 percent
were accompanied by a conviction of at least one individual defendant. 125
Furthermore, in the context of governmental liability, though it had been
theoretically possible to prosecute some municipalities that did not enjoy
the protection of sovereign immunity, 126 "state-initiated criminal
prosecution of local governments was never a preferred remedy." 2 7
One reason for the relative infrequency of entity prosecutions, as
opposed to individual prosecutions, may stem from concerns about the
intersection of tort and criminal liability. Because corporate criminal
convictions result in the transfer of money, it is harder to distinguish
them from civil judgments than in the individual context where prison
time often distinguishes criminal from civil penalties. 12 As intimated at
the outset of this work, 12 9 criminalizing conduct that essentially amounts
See generally Michael H. Hoffheimer, Codifying Necessity: Legislative
123.
Resistance to Enacting Choice-of-Evils Defenses to Criminal Liability, 82 TUL. L. REV.

191 (2007).
124.

See infra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.

125. Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic
Theory and EmpiricalEvidence on Enforcement ofFederalEnvironmental Statutes, 82 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1054, 1074-75 tbl.2 (1992).

126. See supra Section II.B.
127. Green, supra note 20, at 1212.
128. See Cohen, supra note 125, at 1063 ("To many economists, there is no
analytical difference between the criminal and the civil remedy."); Green, supra note 20,
at 1205 ("The lines between 'criminal' and 'civil,' however, were not always entirely
clear.").
129. See supra Part 1.
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to a failure to act to prevent the loss of life (i.e., a risk-based policy
decision) threatens to upend a well-established tort regime that sits better
equipped to account for risk-benefit tradeoffs. 130 Perhaps even more
troubling, the criminalization of environmental policy decisions has the
potential to "trivialize the criminal law itself." 13 1 If prosecutions for the
crimes described herein are to effectively materialize, the distinction
between tort law and criminal law must persist.
"Generally, laws defining crimes require intent, are publicly
enforced, and do not require that a victim be harmed, while laws defining
torts do not require intent, are privately enforced, and require the plaintiff
to establish damages." 3 2 When the lines of intent are blurred (e.g.,
criminal negligence), the first distinguishing feature falls away, but the
others remain. Furthermore, some legal scholars point not to these
practical elemental differences, but rather argue that the only meaningful
distinction between criminal and tortious behavior is "moral culpability,"
with tort law policing non-moral behavior and criminal law attaching
moral responsibility to actions. 133 From this perspective, attaching
criminal culpability to environmental policy decisions simply imbues
those decisions with the appropriate amount of moral weight.
Another perspective, espoused by renowned law and economics
scholar Richard Posner, posits that the primary function of criminal law
in a capitalist society is to maintain the integrity of the free market by
punishing those actors that attempt to bypass it. 134 Posner suggests that
tort law fails to deter market bypassing actions, because the amount of
damages necessary for full deterrence would exceed tort defendants'
ability to pay; hence, the public sanctions and non-monetary punishments
of criminal enforcement must balance the deterrence deficit. 135 The
limited precedent for prosecution of municipalities provides support for
Posner's thesis. According to those who study prosecutions of
municipalities, prosecutions were not generally intended to compensate
130. See Cohen, supra note 125, at 1104 (arguing that "focusing attention on
'corporate crime' is likely to lead to misplaced priorities in environmental protection").
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1058.
133. Jules L. Coleman, Crime, Kickers, and Transaction Structures, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: NOMOS XXVII 313, 326 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985);
see also John C. Coffee, Jr., ParadigmsLost: The Blurringof the Criminaland Civil Law
Models-And What Can be Done about It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1876 (1992) (arguing
"that the criminal law should be reserved to prohibiting conduct that society believes
lacks any social utility, while civil penalties should be used to deter (or 'price') many
forms of misbehavior (for example, negligence) where the regulated activity has positive
social utility but is imposing externalities on others").
134. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 1193, 1195 (1985).
135. Id.

2018]

ENVIRONMENS REA

323

victims, but rather were intended to "punish" bad actors, "correct public
wrongs," and "prevent their repetition" (i.e., deter future crimes). 13 6
Using criminal law to police egregious environmental policy
decisions that result in death would serve a similar deterrence purpose.
Moreover, it would provide some practical advantages both to victims
and defendants. Victims' families would not bear the burden of
coordinating, and potentially financing, the pursuit of justice;
government prosecutors would handle the case. What little record of
criminal prosecutions of municipalities we have suggests that some state
courts indeed viewed state-initiated criminal prosecution as more
efficient than privately funded tort suits.' 37 Defendants, on the other
hand, would be afforded all of the constitutional protections of United
States criminal procedure-protections that do not generally extend to
civil defendants. 138
Even if one accepts that the criminal law can and should police
deadly government decision-making, one might still take the position
that the responsible party in such circumstances would be an individual
official public employee rather than an entire government organization.
In other words, why not look for an individual person whose state of
mind can be more readily deduced, evidenced, and tested against the
penal code? On this question, again, we can look to the experience with
corporate crime and to some unique features of government work.
From a purely economic perspective, there exists no meaningful
distinction between corporate and individual officer penalties if the
officer can bear the full cost of the optimal money damages. 1 However,
as Posner astutely observed, corporations themselves at times lack the
resources to pay judgments at levels that would achieve optimal
deterrence. 14 0 Passing the burden on to employees only extrapolates this
problem. For government officials, whose salaries are fractions of their
private sector counterparts, the ability to pay criminal fines individually
would pale in comparison to the entities' ability to pay.
Furthermore, to achieve efficient deterrence, punishment should be
felt at the level of actor with the ability to forego future bad decisions.
That is one reason why the doctrine of respondeat superior requires
employers to pay tort judgments against employees for actions
committed in furtherance of their employment; the corporation is the
136. Green, supra note 20, at 1207.
137. Id. at 1202.
138. Id. at 1243.
139. Cohen, supra note 125, at 1064.
140. See Posner, supra note 134, at 1228 (remarking that in his view, "[t]he entire
rationale of the criminal law is that the optimal tort remedy is sometimes too large to be
collectible" and that "corporations are not infinitely solvent").
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actor that can prevent bad decisions by its employees. Vicarious liability
implicitly acknowledges that it is most efficient to punish the corporation
directly, which the criminal law permits. 14 1 With respect to government
agencies, the relationship between the entity and the people who run it is
even more entwined than employer-employee. Agencies often have
complicated guidelines and policies dictating how individual officials
should make decisions, and thus the best place to exert an effective
degree of control over future decision-making is at the entity level.1 42 A
conviction of a government entity would thus deter future bad decisionmaking by incentivizing changes to internal policies, but it would not
deter qualified individuals from attempting to benefit society by entering
government and making decisions. 143
From the perspective of an ambitious, rational prosecutor, the entity
can present an easier target than any singular individual within it. It often
proves difficult for a prosecutor, and hence a judge or jury, to determine
how responsibility should be allocated between an entity and an
individual member thereof.1" Thus, it can be simpler and more cost
effective to charge the entity alone.1 4 5 Moreover, some researchers have
observed that juries are generally more likely to convict a corporate
defendant than an individual defendant who served as an employee of
that corporation.1 46 The same effect would likely carry over to the
governmental context.
Despite these advantages, one apparent significant disadvantage
looms-entities cannot be imprisoned, while individuals can. Indeed,
"this was one of the principal reasons [19th] century courts and
commentators cited for the proposition that corporations could not
commit a felony."l 47 This logic applied to government entities as well.
However, generally speaking, environmental and anti-trust laws allow
courts to choose between a fine and imprisonment, making the
unavailability of the latter irrelevant to the question of whether or not an
entity could commit a crime.148 As discussed above, the law has evolved
to acknowledge that entities can be convicted of a wide range of criminal
141. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
142. See Faure et al., supra note 83, at 565.
143. Green, supranote 20, at 1245.
144. Susan L. Smith, Shields for the King's Men: Official Immunity and Other
Obstacles to Effective Prosecution of Federal Officials for Environmental Crimes, 16
COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 16 (1991).
145. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Control of Criminal Conduct in Organizations, 71
B.U. L. REv. 421, 425-28 (1991) (noting that the benefits of prosecuting an organization
alone include reducing the costs of investigating and convicting, increasing the likelihood
of conviction, and avoiding procedural problems).
146. Green, supranote 20, at 1244.
147. Id. at 1221.
148. Id.

2018]

ENVIRONMENS REA

325

offenses, from misdemeanors to felonies. 14 9 The question of whether
exclusively monetary punishment can adequately punish and deter
nonetheless persists.
Fortunately, the law is evolving in this area as well, expanding the
range of punishments available to levy against entities. Most prevalent
among such penalties is "corporate probation,"150 with between 20 and
30 percent of convicted corporations placed on probation."' This
increasingly available sanction utilizes a court order to compel
restorative actions on the part of the entity defendant, such as community
service or a public apology. 152 Consistent with one of the underlying
hypotheses of this work-namely, that criminal sanctions carry some
popular moral stigma not associated with civil penalties-two recent
cases resulted in sentences requiring the defendant corporations to
publicly apologize for their crimes in local newspapers, and one judge
required a chief executive officer to personally appear in court to enter a
guilty plea on behalf of his company. 1 53 Nonetheless, the vast majority of
precedent in the context of death by environmental pollution includes
charges against individuals, sometimes in lieu of charging the corporate
entity.
C.

History of Chargesfor Environmental Crimes Resulting in Death

Despite the relative advantages of entity prosecution just described,
prosecutions for environmental degradation resulting in death have
focused on individuals as well as corporations. They have tended to rely
on violations of specific environmental statutes, rather than general
criminal prohibitions. The general criminal prosecutions that did occur
came in the wake of anomalous environmental and public health
disasters, most notably two famous oil spills. Nonetheless, these
prosecutions can provide important lessons for the future prosecution of

149.
See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
150.
"Corporate probation" refers to court-ordered actions (or prohibitions) that
apply to a convicted corporate defendant for a future period of time. See Marjorie H.
Levin, CorporateProbation Conditions: Judicial Creativity or Abuse ofDiscretion?, 52
FORiDHAM L. REv. 637, 638 (1984). Levin explains:
In response to the perceived inadequacy of fines to control corporate criminal
behavior, some courts have used the Probation Act (Act) to fashion sentencing
alternatives for corporate defendants. For example, courts have imposed
probation conditions requiring bakeries convicted of price fixing to deliver
bread to the poor and polluters to develop environmental clean-up programs.

Id. (citations omitted).
151.

Cohen, supra note 125, at 1082.

152.
153.

Id. at 1083.
Id
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corporate and government entities for environmental policy decisions
that ultimately kill people.
In 2010, the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico
perpetuated one of the most infamous and disastrous oil spills in
history. 154 As a result of a blowout in the oil well and subsequent
explosion, the rig dumped an estimated four million barrels of oil into the
water and 11 workers lost their lives.' 55 The United States Department of
Justice charged two well site leaders, and the company that operated the
rig, British Petroleum (BP), with, inter alia, 11 counts of felony
manslaughter.' 6 The charges against the individuals were ultimately
dropped; 1 7 however, the corporate defendant, BP, pleaded guilty to
felony manslaughter, paid four billion dollars in criminal fines and
sanctions, and was put on probation for a period of five years.' 8
In 1989, the Exxon Valdez struck a reef off the coast of Alaska and
caused another of the most famous oil spills in history." 9 The disaster
prompted much litigation-both civil and criminal. 16 0 In a federal
criminal case, Exxon was charged with two felony and three
misdemeanor counts. 16 ' Exxon pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor and
paid one billion dollars in fines and restitution.1 6 2 In a state criminal case,
on appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that a state of mind
equivalent to simple negligence could be the basis for criminal

154. See generally Lily Rothman, What Caused the Worst Oil Spill in American
History, TIME, Apr. 20, 2015.
155. Talia Buford, In Flint Water Crisis, Could Involuntary Manslaughter Charges
Actually Lead to Prison Time?, PROPUBLICA (June 19, 2017, 12:54 PM), https://www.
propublica.org/article/flint-water-crisis-involuntary-manslaughter-charges-lead-to-prisontime.
156. Id.
157. Id. ("[T]he Justice Department said 'circumstances surrounding the case have
changed' and it could no longer meet the legal threshold for involuntary manslaughter
charges.").
158. Denis Binder, The Increasing Application of Criminal Law in Disasters and
Tragedies:A Global Phenomenon, 38 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 313, 322 (2016).
159. See Cruciotti & Matthews, supra note 12, at 150-54 (describing the events
leading up to the spill); id at 167-70 (describing the consequences and reaction to the
spill).
160. See id at 168. Cruciotti & Matthews explain:
After the spill, attention centered on the legal struggle that ensued between the
state of Alaska, the U.S. government, Exxon, the Exxon Shipping Company,
the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company and Captain Joseph Hazelwood... . In
addition to the cases brought by the state of Alaska and the federal government,
a large number of claims by commercial fisherman, cannery workers, and some
smaller local governments were settled out of court.
Id.; see, e.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991).
161. Binder, supra note 158, at 320-21.
162. Id. at 321.
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liability.16 3 The public outrage and media coverage surrounding the spill
was significant. 16 4 The question of criminal charges focused on Exxon's
moral culpability for the spill.165 Indeed, the prosecutor remarked that

Exxon's guilty plea "reflected the moral sensibilities of the
community."66
Again, it bears repeating that these were anomalous cases, and a
rich history does not yet exist for holding entities, particularly
government agencies, culpable under general criminal prohibitions
against killing of human beings. That is 'not for want of possible
prosecutorial targets or precedent from other countries. This is especially
true if one accepts the argument advanced herein that government
entities also have potential criminal culpability. 167 As just one prominent
and straight-forward example, the United States has essentially admitted
to conducting a medical study in Guatemala in the late 1940s wherein
researchers intentionally infected hundreds of people with gonorrhea and
syphilis (potentially fatal diseases) without their knowledge or
consent. 168 Though no domestic prosecutions in either the United States
or Guatemala have yet resulted, in 2015, the Archdiocese of Guatemala's
Human Rights Office petitioned the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights to rule that the experiments violated the customary
international law on human rights, the American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man, and the American Convention on Human
Rights. 16 9 This potential international law relief, to the extent available,
163. See State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 884 (Alaska 1997) (remarking that "the
negligence standard is constitutionally permissible because it approximates what the due
process guarantee aims at: an assurance that criminal penalties will be imposed only
when the conduct at issue is something society can reasonably expect to deter").
164. See, e.g., John Holusha, Exxon's Public-Relations Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
21, 1989), www.nytimes.com/1989/04/21/business/exxon-s-public-relations-problem.
html?pagewanted=all; see also Thomas A. Birkland & Regina G. Lawrence, The Social
and PoliticalMeaning of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 SPILL Sci. & TECH. BULL. 17, 17
(2002) (describing "[p]ublic reaction [that] ranged from sorrow to outrage"). The New
York Times archive of stories relating to the Exxon Valdez spill can be found at Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill (1989), N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/topic/subject/exxonvaldez-oil-spill-1989 (last visited Dec. 13, 2017).
165. Cohen, supra note 125, at 1059.
166. Id. (quoting L. Gordon Crovitz, Justice for the Birds: Exxon Forgot to Get a
Hunting License, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1991, at A23).
167. See supra Section H.A.
168. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y of State, & Kathleen Sebelius, Sec'y Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Joint Statement on a 1946-1948 Study (Oct. 1, 2010) (transcript
available at https://2009-201 7.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/10/148464.
htm).
169. See Petition in the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights Organization
of American States Washington, D.C. USA at 3-4, Oficina De Derechos Humanos Del
Arzobispado De Guatemala v. Guatemala (2015), https://www.law.uci.edulacademics/
real-life-learning/clinics/IHRC-GuatemalaPetition.pdf.
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presents the closest existing analog to criminal prosecution of a federal
government entity.
Cases that have involved charges of homicide or manslaughter,
rather than charges of violating environmental laws, have come primarily
in the wake of disasters, and guilty verdicts in such cases have almost
exclusively come outside the United States. 170 For example, after
Hurricane Katrina, prosecutors charged the owners of a nursing home
outside New Orleans with negligent homicide and cruelty to the elderly
or infirm based on the facility's decision not to evacuate before the
storm.17 ' They were ultimately acquitted, in part because jurors felt that
the state, rather than the owners of the home, was ultimately responsible
for the residents' safety.1 7 2 The jurors believed that the mistakes made in
preparing for the storm were widespread, and did not feel comfortable
holding just the tiny subset of private actors who were before the court as
defendants criminally responsible.1 73 Similarly, after Cyclone Xynthia
struck France in 2010, officials (including the mayor) and the owner of a
building company in two coastal towns faced charges of manslaughter
based on the permitting and construction of homes within a dangerous
flood zone.1 74 In that case, the jury returned guilty verdicts, resulting in
jail time for the defendants.' 7 ' And the case most closely analogous to
the theory of prosecution posited herein came after a 2009 earthquake in
Italy killed 309 people and injured over 1,100 more. 7 6 Italian
prosecutors charged a number of scientists and a government official
with manslaughter based on their inadequate assessment of earthquake
risk.' 77 The jury returned a guilty verdict in that case in 2013.1s

170. Jessica Anne Wentz, Government Officials' Liability After Extreme Weather
Events: Recent Developments in Domestic andInternationalCase Law, COLUM. L. SCH.:
CLIMATE L. BLOG (Feb. 18, 2015), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2015/
02/18/government-officials-liability-after-extreme-weather-events-recent-developmentsin-domestic-and-international-case-law/ ("Public officials and private actors have thus
been put on notice that, at least in certain jurisdictions and under certain circumstances,
they could incur civil and even criminal liability for negligent or reckless conduct that
contributes to death or damage during an extreme weather event.").
171. Katrina Nursing Home Owners Acquitted, NBC NEWS, http://www.nbcnews.
com/id/20649744/ns/usnews-crime andcourts/t/katrinanursing-home-ownersacquitted/#.Vh4qdrRViko (last updated Sept. 7, 2007, 10:26 PM).
172. Id. (quoting two jurors as saying, "There were a lot of mistakes made, and it
should have been a lot of people answering for it. So why just these two people?" and
"The state was responsible for the safety of nursing home residents. They didn't do what
they should have.").
173. See id.
174. Binder, supra note 158, at 347-48.
175. See id. at 348.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 348-49.
178. See id. at 349.
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D. Flint, Michigan as a Test Case
As this article goes to press, perhaps the most prominent example of
charging government officials with manslaughter on the basis of
environmental policy decisions makes headlines.1 79 The case stems from
the so-called "water crisis" in Flint, Michigan.180 In an attempt to save
money, the city shifted its drinking water source from Lake Huron
(Detroit's supplier) to the Flint River.181 Flint officials declined to utilize
a corrosion control agent to protect the city's pipes from leeching into the
water supply. 182 Lead from the pipes ultimately contaminated the water;
despite officials' assertions that the water was safe to drink, this
contamination has resulted in 87 cases of Legionnaires' disease,
including nine deaths, since the spring of 2014.183
Assigning legal responsibility for the crisis has been the focus of the
Michigan Attorney General, who had plenty of help from the media, the
public, and expert analysts. The investigative record indicates that a
number of government entities could have been found culpable-from
the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality to the Flint Water
Department to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 18 4
Ultimately, the Attorney General charged the Director of the Michigan
Department of Health and Human Services, the Flint Emergency
Manager, the Flint Water Department Manager, the Drinking Water
179. See, e.g., Another Michigan official to face manslaughter charge in Flint water
crisis, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Oct. 9, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
nationworld/midwest/ct-flint-water-crisis-charges-20171009-story.html; Scott Atkinson
& Monica Davey, ManslaughterIs Charge for 5 in Flint Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
2017, at Al.
180. See Flint Water Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/flintwater-crisis (last visited Dec. 6, 2017).
Buford, supra note 155; see also TODD FLOOD ET AL., INTERIM REPORT OF THE
181.
FLINT WATER CRISIS INVESTIGATION 5-6 (2017), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/
ag/Flint+Water+Interim+Report_575711 7.pdf (laying out how the designation of Flint
as a "local government financial emergency" was followed by the switch in water
supplies).
182.

FLOOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 4.

183. Id. at 6-9.
184. See David A. Dana & Deborah Tuerkheimer, After Flint: EnvironmentalJustice
as Equal Protection, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 93, 94 (2017). According to Dana and
Tuerkheimer:
MDEQ [Michigan Department of Environmental Quality] appears to bear
primary responsibility for the disaster. But across the board, governmental
workers at the state Department of Health and Human Services, the Governor's
office, the county health department, and the EPA, among others, all fell short
of their responsibilities to the citizens of Flint. The clear picture that emerges is
one of systemic disregard for the city's residents ....
Id.; see also MATHEw M. DAVIS ET AL., FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE FINAL
REPORT 1
(2016), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/FWATFFINAL_
REPORT_21March2Ol6_517805_7.pdf.
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Chief of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, and the
Water Supervisor with involuntary manslaughter.1 85 Interestingly, none
of the entities were charged. The charges allege that the officials failed to
properly alert the public about the Legionnaires' cases, withholding
crucial information that might have prompted members of the
community to avoid the water had they known of the water quality
issues.186 The charges specifically assign responsibility for the death of
one victim, though there were many. 87 Government emails from 2014 to
2016 provided the basis for the charges, demonstrating that certain
officials were aware of the pattern of Legionnaires' cases, but that they
failed to act. 88 In addition to these state charges, federal charges may yet
be forthcoming, as the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan
continues to investigate the events surrounding the water crisis. 8 9
As the discussion thus far has indicated, these types of manslaughter
charges based on environmental policy-even against individuals within
the government-are extremely rare in the United States and mostly
unprecedented.'9 These cases test the underlying observation that
motivates this article-knowing killing by policy action (or inaction)
cannot be meaningfully distinguished from knowing killing by a physical
instrument. If a Michigan jury finds these government individuals guilty
of manslaughter (or they enter guilty pleas resulting in convictions),
significant precedent will be set that lays the groundwork for government
entity criminal liability on the basis of environmental decision-making.
For the reasons set forth above,19 1 future prosecutors looking to try
185.
Atkinson & Davey, supra note 179, at Al; Mich. Dep't of Att'y Gen., Schuette
Charges MDHHS DirectorLyon, Four Others with Involuntary Manslaughter in Flint
Water Crisis, MICHIGAN.GOV (June 14, 2017), http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-

164-78314-423854-,00.html.
186. See Mich. Dep't of Att'y Gen., supra note 185.
187. Id. A publication by the Michigan Department of Attorney General stated:
All defendants charged with involuntary manslaughter are charged in relation
to the death of Robert Skidmore, 85, of Mt. Morris, Michigan. Skidmore died
of Legionnaires' disease after many others had been diagnosed with the illness,
yet no public outbreak notice had been issued. The charges allege failure to
notify and lack of action to stop the outbreak allowed the disease to continue its
spread through Flint's water system.
Id. In Michigan, involuntary manslaughter carries a potential sentence of up to 15 years

in prison and a $7,500 fine. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.321 (2017).
188.
189.

Mich. Dep't of Att'y Gen., supranote 185.
Buford, supra note 155.

190. Id. ("As environmental crimes go, the levying of felony involuntary
manslaughter charges against high-ranking state and city officials has put the Flint water
crisis investigation squarely into new territory."); Matthew Dolan, ManslaughterCharges
Against Politicians Will Be Tough: Here's Why, DETROiTrr FREE PRESS (June 14, 2017,

11:36
AM),
http://www.freep.com/story/news/ocal/michigan/2017/06/14/criminalcharges-michigan-officials/395575001/.
191. See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
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similar cases against government officials would likely perceive the
benefits of charging the entity itself rather than the individuals working
for it.
Commentators and scholars have engaged in a lively debate about
the likelihood of obtaining convictions in these cases. 1 92 Some, like
Professor Peter Henning, stress the difficult task facing the prosecution
in proving a direct causal relationship between the government inaction
and the outbreak of Legionnaires' disease.193 Establishing direct
causation is particularly difficult because, unlike most homicide cases,
the defendants' decision at the heart of these cases was an act of
omission, rather than commission. 194 Whether or not one can be
criminally culpable for a failure to act would likely be a question
common to many future cases against policymaking individuals or
entities. Often the deadliest environmental policy decisions are decisions
to do nothing to control a pollutant, preserve a natural resource, or
address an environmental condition. As in almost any case involving
environmental law, expert testimony will feature prominently-here, in
the context of the Flint water crisis, demonstrating the connection
between the lead contamination and Legionnaires' disease. 195 Testimony
in these cases would also have to show, however, that the information
known to officials clearly indicated that death would result from
inaction.
According to at least one former chief of the Environmental Crimes
Section of the United States Department of Justice, it is not outside the
normal bounds of the criminal law to apply manslaughter to
circumstances where death results from exposure to unabated
environmental contamination, provided the requisite knowledge on the
part of government officials can be proved. 196 The Flint cases, in
particular, benefit from many years of well-established scientific,
economic, and health research on the effects of lead and prevention of its
inclusion in drinking water. The cost-benefit analyses, showing that
many lives would be saved if a few dollars had been spent, have been

192. See, e.g., State has "a lot to prove" to win convictions for involuntary
manslaughter in Flint crisis, NAT'L PuB. RADIO (June 19, 2017) (featuring an interview
with Professor Adam Candeub of Michigan State University College of Law).
193. Dolan, supra note 190.
194. Id. ("This is a case about an omission, a failure to act, not typical in a homicide
case.").
195. See id.
196. Id. (quoting Steve Solow, Partner, Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP) ("Is it within
the normal boundaries of criminal law to hold a state official criminally liable for acts
while in office for this kind of harm? The answer is a qualified yes, depending what they
knew and when they knew it and what they did with that information.").
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done many times over. 197 Indeed, much of the public is aware of the
danger lead poses, particularly to children. In other words, it should not
be too difficult to demonstrate that knowledge of the existence of lead in
drinking water meant knowledge that children would die.
The need to pursue criminal justice, international or otherwise, for
overt actions that directly harm other human beings presents the
strongest argument .for government entity culpability. But what of
situations, like Flint,1 98 where it is the government entity's failure or
refusal to act that results in death? Such is the state of affairs for many of
the harms from environmental policy decisions. As the pending Flint
case suggests, the criminal law does impose liability for omission in
certain scenarios, notably where a duty exists. With respect to
environmental protection, the government owes a duty of care to its
citizens based upon statutes and, more fundamentally, by the nature of
the fact that it controls public resources (such as air and water). 199
Furthermore, the law of omission recognizes that when a party acts to
create a dangerous situation, a duty may arise where one may not have
otherwise existed. 2 00 Government decisions of the past, related to
197. See Carla Campbell et al., A Case Study ofEnvironmentalInjustice: The Failure
in Flint, 13 INT'L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 951, 953 (2016). Campbell explains:
The costs from lead poisoning are considerable, as are the cost savings for
prevention of childhood lead poisoning. Attina and Trasande state that in the
United States and Europe the lead-attributable economic costs have been
estimated at $50.9 and $55 billion dollars, respectively... . A previous analysis
showed that each dollar invested in lead paint hazard control results in a return
of $17-$221 or a net savings of $181-$269 billion for a specific cohort of
children under six years of age.
Id. (citations omitted).
198. Flint is not by any means the only example of the failure of government to
address ongoing harm to its citizens, even in the water quality context alone. The
Washington, D.C. water crisis is an example of a looming crisis of similar concern. See
Eric Moorman, "A GreaterSense Of Urgency ": EPA's Emergency Authority Under The
Safe Drinking Water Act And Lessons From Flint, Michigan, 47 ENvTL. L. REP. 10786,
10793-94 (2017).
199. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300i (2012). For example, Title 42 of the United States
Code states:
[T]he Administrator [of EPA], upon receipt of information that a contaminant
which is present in or is likely to enter a public water system or an underground
source of drinking water, or that there is a threatened or potential terrorist
attack (or other intentional act designed to disrupt the provision of safe drinking
water or to impact adversely the safety of drinking water supplied to
communities and individuals), which may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the health of persons, and that appropriate State and local
authorities have not acted to protect the health of such persons, may take such
actions as he may deem necessary in order to protect the health of such persons.
Id.
200.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

314 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965)

(describing, as one of the situations where a duty to act to protect another exists, a
situation of peril created by the actor's conduct).

2018]

ENVIRONMENS REA

333

environmental policy and others, have contributed to the creation of the
dangerous situation we face today. Thus, the question of criminal
culpability for government entities turns more on the mens rea element
than on any act versus omission distinction.2 01
IV. KNOWING KILLING IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING

Thanks in large part to advances in technology and scientific
understanding, entities responsible for making decisions about the
cleanliness of our environment have the ability to obtain, and do in fact
possess, knowledge that could satisfy the intent element of a crime.
Some 'hypothetical examples utilizing common environmental policy
decisions illustrate this point.
A. Knowledge in the InformationAge
The concept of a "statistical life" 202 in risk and decision analysis
predates even the Pinto case. It is with this case, however, that the
concept came into the public consciousness. Ford engineers and
executives were portrayed in the popular media as cold-hearted, and
were criminally prosecuted, for having determined that the expected
large expense of installing additional safety measures in the Pinto
outweighed the expected loss of 180 unknown "statistical lives" due to
the cheaper design. 20 3 In other words, to Ford, the value of a statistical
life (or 180 statistical lives, to be precise) was less than the cost of the
additional safety measures. At the time of that decision, Ford had no way
of knowing the identities of the predicted casualties, but modeling could
provide a number of expected deaths. 2 04 Those indeterminate people
whose deaths will, according to modeling, be the result of a decision
have moral, and criminal, significance. Indeed, some of the most horrific
crimes in recent memory have not targeted specific individual victims,
201. There is, of course, also a question of the relative culpability of the regulators
versus the regulated, especially with respect to emissions and other pollution. That is
beyond the scope of this article for two reasons. First and foremost, much has been
written about holding polluters accountable for their actions. Second, the theoretical
questions and difficult issues present differently in the context of corporate polluters,
particular when they are operating in compliance with environmental regulations. This
article operates from the assumption that rational polluters will emit pollutants to the
fullest extent permitted by those regulations.

202. Heinzerling, supra note 19, at 530 ("At the least, a statistical life is an
unidentified life; we do not know who will die when a statistical life hangs in the
balance.").
203.
DOUGLAS BIRSCH & JOHN H. FIELDER, THE FORD PINTO CASE: A STUDY IN
APPLIED ETHICS, BUSINESS, AND TECHNOLOGY 28 (1994); see Epstein, supra note 16, at
20; see also Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct. 1977, at 18.

204.

See Epstein, supra note 16, at 19-20.
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but rather had as their aim the death of large numbers of indeterminate
citizens.205 As Heinzerling aptly stated, "[t]here are no statistical people;
there are only real people. If a person dies due to an environmental
hazard, a real person dies-even if we do not know who she is, and even
if many other people were also exposed to the hazard that killed her." 20 6
Thanks to advances in computing technology and environmental
science, the decision tools available to environmental policymakers have
become quite sophisticated.20 7 A variety of modeling software exists for
a whole suite of environmental problems from water quality 20 8 to power
plant operations. 20 9 These models can make projections with varying
degrees of confidence. When the model is 95 percent confident in a
range of outcomes in terms of statistical lives lost, or deaths prevented,
210
it would seem that the prediction has not
based on the policy choice,
only statistical, but also criminal, significance. As described earlier, an
actor is said to have knowledge of a result if it is "practically certain" to
occur and is said to act recklessly when there is a "substantial risk" of the
result. 2 11 Thus, when armed with the type of modeling now readily
available, government entities possess the ability to act at least
recklessly, if not knowingly, with regard to indeterminate human lives.
205. For example, the Boston Marathon Bombings of April 15, 2013 resulted in
many injuries and deaths of people unknown to the perpetrators. See generally Terror at
the Marathon, Bos. GLOBE http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/specials/bostonmarathon-explosions (last visited Dec. 7, 2017).
206. Heinzerling, supra note 19, at 531; see also Mark Kelman, Saving Lives, Saving
from Death, Savingfrom Dying: Reflections on 'Over- Valuing' Identifiable Victims, 11
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L., &ETHICS 51, 59-60 (2011).
207. See generally GONGBING PENG, LANCE M. LESLIE & YAPING SHAO,
ENVIRONMENTAL MODELLING AND PREDICTION (2002); ENVIRONMENTAL MODELLING,
SOFTWARE AND DECISION SUPPORT: STATE OF THE ART AND NEW PERSPECTIVES (Anthony
J. Jakeman, Alexey A. Voinov, Andrea E. Rizzoli & Serena H. Chen eds., 2008); Olaf
David et al., A Software Engineering Perspective on Environmental Modeling
FrameworkDesign: The Object Modeling System, 39 ENVTL. MODELLING & SOFTWARE

201 (2013); Anthony J. Jakeman et al., Ten Iterative Steps in Development and
Evaluation ofEnvironmentalModels, 21 ENvTL. MODELLING & SOFTWARE 602 (2006).
See, e.g., Surface Water Models, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.
208.

gov/exposure-assessment-models/surface-water-models (last visited Dec. 14, 2017)
(describing, and providing access to, a number of EPA models for contaminants in
surface water).
209. See, e.g., Clean Air Markets-Power Sector Modeling, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/clean-air-markets-power-sector-modeling (last
visited Dec. 14, 2017) (describing, and providing access to, EPA's Integrated Planning
Model).
210. Risk analysts and epidemiologists compare the model results under the
considered policies to the no-action alternative to calculate the number of "excess deaths"
(or, when expressed as a rate, "excess mortality"). See, e.g., Antonio Gasparrini et al.,
Projections of temperature-relatedexcess mortality under climate change scenarios,
LANCET PLANETARY HEALTH, Nov. 14, 2017, at 2-3.
211. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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Obviously, the degree of certainty in the model's projections would
affect the precise level of mens rea, but, if Ford could be criminally
charged 50 years ago, science and technology surely have advanced to
the point where projections can constitute a criminally relevant degree of
knowledge.
As the Pinto case, and the commentary that followed, illustrated,
using statistical analyses of expected premature deaths (or lives saved) as
clear evidence of knowledge for the purposes of criminal law has the
potential to paralyze decision-makers working with or regulating
dangerous subjects (i.e., things that inevitably cause some injury and
death). In such circumstances, models will show that deaths will result
from any one of the range of decisions and thus, applied bluntly and
harshly, the criminal law would make all of those decisions culpable.
There must be some limit on the criminal law's application in these
circumstances; otherwise, decision-makers will be incentivized to either
remain ignorant to the human consequences of policy options and fail to
invest in improved scientific modeling or, worse, simply neglect to make
important decisions. One might describe this problem as one of
"overdeterrence" to the point of paralysis or even negative feedback.2 12
Clearly, the interaction of the criminal justice system with the
regulatory process must be carefully constrained. The above discussion
should illuminate, however, that the necessary constraints are not built in
to the criminal law of intent or the concept of legal "personhood."
Furthermore, because optimal policymaking requires fully informed
actors, constraining the application of criminal law by halting
technological advancements or government research seems highly
undesirable. To avoid that undesirable outcome, a few existing
mechanisms must be appropriately applied to contemplated prosecution
of government entities for environmental policy decisions. Those
mechanisms, discussed in other sections of this work, include the defense
of necessity, 2 13 the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 2 14 and statutory

reform.2 15 It is beyond the scope of this work to devise new mechanisms
that might cabin the potential negative consequences that flow from the
increased prosecution of the type of crimes described herein.
212.
See Cohen, supra note
overdeterrence:

125, at 1062.

Cohen explains

this concept of

The concern is that high penalties will lead to 'overdeterrence' of activities that
society does not wish to prohibit entirely. We do not, for example, want to raise

the 'price' of causing an oil spill so high that we deter firms from engaging in
the socially beneficial practice of oil transportation.
Id.
213.
See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.

214.

See infra Section V.A.

215.

See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
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B. A CERCLA Illustration

Consider how this framework might apply to a decision about the
level of cleanup at a Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 216 site (i.e., the record of
decision outlining the cleanup alternative selected). Better known as
"Superfund," this statute requires responsible parties to pay for the
cleanup of contaminated sites.217 Once a site has been identified, EPA
prepares a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS), which
would include information about the expected exposure of people in the
surrounding community. Based on the advanced modeling technology
and epidemiological studies now available, the RI/FS for a given site
could very likely indicate the number of additional individuals (i.e.,
above some baseline cancer rate) who would contract cancer as a result
of different levels of exposure.218 Combined with cancer research
demonstrating survival rates for the types of cancer at issue, the exposure
figures provide a basis of knowledge about the outcomes of different
cleanup scenarios in terms of lives lost (or saved).
Hence, EPA's decisions regarding whether or not to clean up the
site and what level of cleanup is necessary would likely be knowing
decisions about the lives of humans in the nearby community. Deciding,
without a legitimate defense, to cut short the lives of citizens just to save
money on the cleanup would thus become criminally culpable behavior
when those citizens ultimately passed away. Deciding whether or not to
bring such charges would involve further analysis of, inter alia, the
modeling and science involved, the range of potential outcomes, and the
alternatives available to EPA. Regardless of the merits of exercising
prosecutorial discretion in this highly simplified hypothetical, the
situation illustrates how scientific improvements, together with the mens
rea concept of knowledge, can imbue environmental policymaking with
criminal, in addition to moral, culpability.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROSECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

The analysis above should affect the behavior of both prosecutors
deciding whether and which government entities or officials to charge
with crimes and administrators deciding which policies to adopt and
216.
217.

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2012).
See id at § 9607. For a helpful overview of the CERCLA process, see U.S.

ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Tius is SUPERFUND: A COMMUNrrY GUIDE TO EPA's SUPERFUND

PROGRAM (2011), https://sernspub.epa.gov/work/HQ/1 75197.pdf.
218. Risk analysts and epidemiologists use the term "excess deaths" (or, when
expressed as a rate, "excess mortality") to describe this difference from the control, or
baseline, condition.
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implement. The implications for prosecutors reach beyond the
intersection of criminal and environmental law; decisions about how far
to push the concepts of mens rea and manslaughter could affect the
continued efficacy of the entire criminal justice system, as well as the
public's faith in it. Government agencies taking seriously their own
potential criminal culpability can utilize that additional dimension of
analysis to improve policymaking and communication.
A. ProsecutorsExercisingDiscretion
The criminal law of intent, as currently understood, does not
constrain the reach of powerful criminal prohibitions (and associated
penalties). While the risks of overdeterrence and paralysis in
environmental decision-making may undoubtedly exist, any argument
that the law itself fully accounts for those risks (e.g., through the
separation of tort from crime) is disingenuous. 2 19 Absent statutory reform
heightening the mens rea requirements for entity (rather than individual)
criminal defendants, many decisions would theoretically create both
criminal and tort culpability. 2 20 Unaddressed and unconstrained, the

problems presented by criminal culpability, manifesting through
countless prosecutions, could erode public support in, and the ultimate
effectiveness of, the environmental criminal law and the entire criminal
justice system. Fortunately, the risks presented by criminalization of
government entity non- or mal-feasance in environmental policymaking
are not dissimilar from risks that the United States Department of Justice
has dealt with for years in the general realm of corporate criminal
liability. The chief tool for managing these risks, and thus maintaining
the coexistence of effective criminal and civil systems, has thus far been
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
The Department of Justice has for many years operated under
guidelines issued by successive Deputy Attorneys General carefully
dictating when, and when not, to file criminal charges against
corporations. 2 2 1 These guidelines governed discretion not only with
219. One need only look to the existence of criminal negligence prohibitions in
various contexts to see that the bright-line distinction between tort and crime has been
blurred for some time-if it ever was as clear as some scholars would like to think.
220. One such potential reform might enshrine in law some of the guidance-based
limitations on prosecutorial discretion. See infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
For example, a statutory reform of the mens rea requirement for entities might require not
only knowledge of the expected loss of human life but also intentionally keeping that
knowledge from the public.
221. The famous foundational memorandum in this respect was authored by Deputy
Attorney General Larry Thompson in 2003. See generally Thompson, supra note 106.
Since the Thompson Memo, successors have issued similar memoranda modifying the
Department of Justice policy on the issue of corporate prosecution. See generally Mark
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respect to prosecutions of corporations, but also-importantly, for the
purposes of this article-explicitly "appl[ied] to the consideration of the
prosecution of all types of business organizations, including ...
The foundational "Thompson Memo" delineated
government entities. ,,222Thfon
a number of specific factors to guide a prosecutor's decision whether or
not to pursue charges against a corporate entity.2 23 Of the nine factors,
three could have particular relevance to the question of whether or not to
prosecute a government entity for an environmental policy decision: (1)
potential collateral consequences on innocent parties, including the
public; (2) adequacy of the prosecution of individuals within the entity;

Filip, U.S. Deputy Attorney Gen., Memorandum to Heads of Department Components
and United States Attorneys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/
dag-memo-08282008.pdf; Paul J. McNulty, U.S. Deputy Attorney Gen., Memorandum to
Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys on Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (2006), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
dag/legacy/2007/07/05/mcnultymemo.pdf; Sally Q. Yates, U.S. Deputy Attorney Gen.,
Memorandum to Six Assistant Attorney Generals, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Director of the Executive Office for United States Trustees, and United
States Attorneys on Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download.
222. Thompson, supra note 106, at 1 n.1. This footnote in the Thompson Memo,
which applied the memo's guidelines to prosecutions of government entities, also
appeared in the memos authored by Filip and McNulty. See Filip, supra note 221, at 1
n.1; McNulty, supranote 221, at 1 n.1.
223. The Thompson Memo stated:
[P]rosecutors should consider the following factors in reaching a decision as to
the proper treatment of a corporate target:
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the
public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution
of corporations for particular categories of crime;
2. the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the
complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate management;
3. the corporation's history of similar conduct, including prior criminal, civil,
and regulatory enforcement actions against it;
4. the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if
necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client and work product protection;
5. the existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance program;
6. the corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an
effective corporate compliance program or to improve an existing one, to
replace responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay
restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies;
7. collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to shareholders,
pension holders and employees not proven personally culpable and impact on
the public arising from the prosecution; and
8. the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the
corporation's malfeasance;
9. the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions.
Thompson, supra note 106, at 3 (citations omitted).
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and (3) adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement
actions. 224
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion guided by these memoranda
has been met with mixed reactions from the scholarly community and the
bar. 225 Though some of the most forceful critics believed that the
approach in the Thompson Memo "threaten[ed] the very foundation of
our system of justice, ,,226 no such apocalyptic result came about. Flaws
were exposed, and subsequent Department of Justice guidelines have
modified the initial approach, but, overall, the prosecution of
corporations has not overwhelmed the criminal justice system or
rendered the civil system irrelevant or obsolete.
The Department of Justice guidelines would, of course, not apply to
state court prosecutions under the laws prohibiting manslaughter and
other forms of knowing killing. Nonetheless, these guidelines provide an
illustrative test case and helpful model of coordinated prosecutorial
discretion as a protective measure against the risks of overdeterrence and
decision paralysis. Corporations still operate and generate significant
profits despite limited prosecution pursuant to the Department of Justice
guidelines. The federal justice system remains functional. Similarly,
government agencies would continue to make policy choices and state
justice systems would still operate if carefully calibrated constraints of
prosecutorial discretion were applied to prosecutions of government
entities.
While it is beyond the scope of this work to propose such guidelines
in their entirety, some factors to consider present themselves quite
readily. In addition to the Thompson Memo factors, particularly those
highlighted above, prosecutors would also want to consider: the degree
of deception, if any, employed by the potential government entity
defendant in hiding from the public what it knew 2 2 7 and the degree of
harm caused by the decision at issue, especially in comparison to
alternatives. Considerations like these should help maintain the balance
between tort and criminal law while preventing prosecutions from
deterring the government into paralysis.
224. See id.
225. Compare Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in
CorporateProsecutionAgreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1435 (2007) (describing the
Thompson Memo as the subject of "[c]ondemnation ... from all directions"), with
Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, CorporateCriminalProsecution in a Post-Enron
World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1095, 1096
(2006) (taking the position that "the [Thompson] Memo has largely accomplished its
objectives and that many of the criticisms are overwrought").
226. Wray & Hur, supra note 225, at 1096.
227. For a good example of a situation meeting this criteria, see the prior description
of the Flint Water Crisis, supra Section III.D.
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B. Policymakers Choosing and Communicating
As stated at the outset, the object of this article is not simply to lay
the groundwork for a manslaughter prosecution of EPA. Likewise, the
article is not meant to be a hollow thought experiment. While limited
prosecutions, constrained by the tools just described, are desirable, the
real utility of the analysis herein should be felt by policymakers and
comes in two areas. 228
First, policymakers ought to carefully consider how the potential
criminality of their choices factors into decisions. Clearly, society would
not be better off if such consideration paralyzes federal agencies, and
there are some decisions wherein every option will almost certainly
result in loss of life above the baseline. However, if policymakers add a
moral and criminal dimension to their analysis, perhaps they will craft
more robustly reasoned policies that benefit both society and their own
consciences. According to one scholarly account, this added dimension is
precisely how the potential for criminal liability has affected
environmental policymakers in Germany, where the threat of prosecution
is theoretically real, but has not in practice been widely exercised.229
Accordingly, if coordinated prosecutorial discretion counsels against
prosecution in almost all instances, the theoretical threat of prosecution
still serves a valuable purpose in directing policy. Indeed, the ideal
societal outcome would be that actual prosecutions not be necessary to
achieve the desired level of protection of human health and the
environment.
Second, to the extent that policymakers select options that prioritize
saving statistical lives over other potential objectives, the framework
proposed herein provides a useful tool for communicating that selection
to constituents and garnering support. Kahan and his colleagues have
demonstrated that people tend to acknowledge (or do not acknowledge)
228. One alternative scenario exists in which this article operates to create perverse
incentives for government entities not to conduct modeling or risk analysis, at least with
respect to human lives. Or perhaps the government shields such studies from public
access in the future. The publication of this article indicates that, to the author's
estimation, this article will more likely result in lives saved than government secrecy.
Moreover, the confidence in that calculus does not rise to the level of certainty necessary
to establish a mens rea.
229. Faure et al., supra note 83, at 548. Faure et al. state:
Until today, the [German] system has obtained only one final conviction of an
environmental protection agency official for an environmental crime. This fact,
however, does not justify the conclusion that criminal liability of government
officials is irrelevant under German law. The mere possibility of prosecution
deters German civil servants who work for environmental agencies from
committing violations.
Id. (citation omitted).
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the existence of environmental problems (specifically climate change),
and thereby support (or oppose) policies to combat them, based largely
upon their worldviews along two discreet dimensions-"hierarchyegalitarianism" and "individualism-communitarianism." 230 As predicted
by cultural cognition theory and confirmed by experimentation,
egalitarian communitarians (i.e., those who "favo[r] less regimented
forms of social organization and greater collective attention to individual
needs") tend to believe in climate change and support policies aimed at
it. 2 3 1 The opposite is true of hierarchical individualists (i.e., those who
"tie[] authority to conspicuous social rankings and eschew[] collective
interference with the decisions of individuals possessing such
authority"). 232 However, Kahan's analysis and experimentation focused
on climate change as a collective environmental problem.23 3 One might
expect a shift in focus to crime to alter the alignment of hierarchical
individualists. Indeed, in other contexts, research suggests that
hierarchists see crime as a danger to society, because, according to
Kahan and Braman, "drugs are emblematic of deviancy."234 Thus, if
communicators emphasize the potential criminal implications, murderous
climate policy on the part of the government or bad action on the part of
emitters could likewise be emblematic of deviancy and worthy of
eradicating to hierarchical individualists.
For this strategy to have the full desired effect, the criminal, rather
than civil, nature of potential liability is critical. As some scholars have
observed, and research has confirmed, when conduct is described as
criminal (i.e., "criminalized") people are more likely to find it morally
235ctinoascerf
prohibited and desire its suppression.
The effect is not as clear if
236
conduct simply results in tort liability.
Some have suggested that this
stigma distinction explains why prosecutors pursue criminal charges
230.
Kahan et al. supra note 25, at 733-35; Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan, Paul
Slovic, John Gastil & Geoffrey L. Cohen, The Second National Risk and Culture Study:
Making Sense of-and Making Progress In-The American Culture War of Fact 2

(George Wash. Law Faculty Publ'ns & Other Works, Paper No. 211, 2000),
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/facultypublications/211.
231.
Kahan et al., supra note 25, at 732.

232.
233.

Id.
See id.

234.
Kahan & Braman, supra note 27, at 157.
235.
See Bert I. Huang, Law and Moral Dilemmas the Trolley Problem Mysteries,
130 HARv. L. REv. 659, 690-92 (2016) (reviewing F.M. KAMM, THE TROLLEY PROBLEM
MYSTERIES (2015)).

236.
See id at 678 n.81 (citing ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 6 (2016)
(providing an account of tort law that "start[s] from the moral idea that no person is in
charge of another"); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88
TEx. L. REv. 917, 919 (2010) (recognizing torts as "legal wrongs rather than moral
wrongs")) ("Whether civil wrongs are so readily mapped onto moral prohibitions is more
controversial.").
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against corporations when the available civil and criminal monetary
sanctions do not differ.237 The famous Henry M. Hart, Jr., trying to distill
a principled distinction between civil and criminal law beyond the
tautological "a crime is anything which is called a crime," 2 38 posited that
a crime "is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a
formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the
community."239 Thus, following Hart's logic leads to the conclusion that
what is called a crime are those acts that the community deems deserving
of moral condemnation. Moral condemnation is the bread and butter of
hierarchical individualists; it provides clear demarcation between good
and bad people, those deserving of success and those not.
This understanding of the moral import of the label of "crime" is
consistent with other classical understandings of crime and punishment
and the rule of law; key concepts for hierarchical thinkers. As Wolfgang
Friedmann wrote, "the main purpose of a [criminal] fine is not primarily
to hurt the defendant financially . .. [i]t is to attach a stigma." 24 0
Importantly, that stigma can attach before a conviction ever occurs241 and
can attach to government entities, not just other persons. 242 Thus,
discussion of the potential criminality of environmental policy decisions
could add significant and compelling weight to policy communication,
especially with groups whose worldviews place a higher degree of
importance on morality, the rule of law, and individual responsibility.

237. Cohen, supra note 125, at 1060 ("The apparent moral stigma attached to being
labeled a 'criminal' might also help to explain why the government insists on criminal
charges for corporations that could receive identical monetary and non-monetary
sanctions under civil and administrative remedies."); see also Green, supra note 20, at
1234-35 ("Unless criminal fines and probation further some policy goal that civil fines
do not, there would be no logical explanation for their being applied to municipalities.");
Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of CriminalSanctions in Environmental Law, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 889, 889 (1991) (arguing that the criminal law has a "unique
capacity" to "shame those who violate society's increasingly strict norms of
environmental protection").
238.

Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

401, 404 (1958).
239. Id. at 405.
240.

FRIEDMANN, supranote 73, at 211.

241. See generally William J. Leedom, Removing the Stigma of Arrest: The Courts,
the Legislatures and Unconvicted Arrestees, 47 WASH. L. REv. 659 (1972) (discussing
the stigma of arrest and pre-trial detention).
242. See Green, supra note 20, at 1234 (arguing that "local governments can be the
appropriate object of the stigma and moral condemnation that usually accompany
criminal prosecution").
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VI. APPLICATION OF THIS FRAMEWORK AND ANALYSIS TO
CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DECISIONS

Decisions about environmental policy are made every day, and the
analysis laid out in this article could inform each and every one of them.
Looking at a few prominent examples will illustrate how policymakers,
and one prosecutor in Michigan, might make use of the framework
provided.
A.

Climate Change and the Clean Power Plan

Long before President Donald J. Trump's administration, the United
States government's inaction on climate change had been described as a
crime by some politicians and academics.243 Such rhetorical flourishes do
not necessarily signal that the elements of a crime were present, or
provable, but they do indicate that at least some responsible actors may
recognize the potential for criminal culpability in environmental
decision-making. In particular, green criminologists classified the denial
of climate change and the failure to adopt mitigation and adaptation
244
policies at the insistence of industry lobbyists as state-corporate crime.
The Obama administration eventually changed course on at least some of
the inaction that prompted the criminal accusations, but those policies are
now set to shift back in the other direction.
The Clean Power Plan was President Obama's signature rulemaking
with the objective of mitigating climate change by reducing carbon
dioxide emissions from existing power plants. 245 According to EPA's
modeling, the Clean Power Plan, if fully implemented, would prevent
1,500 to 3,600 premature deaths annually. 244 The Plan has been the
subject of much litigation and its operation has been stayed by the
Supreme Court.247 President Donald J. Trump's administration recently
proposed a repeal of the Clean Power Plan. 248 The proposed repeal is
243. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, the chief climate advisor to the government of
Germany, said the following about the George W. Bush administration's inaction on
climate change: "This was a crime." MARK HERTSGAARD, HOT: LIVING THROUGH THE
NEXT FiFry YEARS ON EARTH 254 (2011).
244. Kramer & Michalowski, supra note 13, at 71; see also Lynch et al., supra note

10, at 215-16.
245. See Obama, supra note 2.
246. See FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan By The Numbers, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-planAGENCY,

numbers.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
247. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016) (order granting
stay).

248. See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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based on the administration's view that the design of the Clean Power
Plan exceeded EPA's authority under the Clean Air Act, but,
importantly, it is not based on a determination that EPA cannot, or
should not, regulate greenhouse gases altogether. 24 9 Thus, if the repeal
rule becomes final, EPA will have to decide whether to propose a new
rule providing emission guidelines for existing sources that reflect the
"best system of emission reduction" (BSER).250 Many factors will
undoubtedly influence whether, and how, EPA decides to replace the
Clean Power Plan. Among those factors should be the organizational
culpability for the resultant loss of human life. As in the criminal law, the
degree of certainty with respect to the resultant loss of statistical lives (as
described in the documents providing support for the rule) should be
directly relevant to the degree of culpability attributed to EPA, and the
administration more broadly.25 1 Society should be aware of the level of
certainty at which EPA is acting to the detriment of human lives and hold
EPA, and other governmental actors, accountable, if not in a court of
law, then in the court of public opinion.
B. OtherAir Pollutants
Other recently implemented air pollution regulations now face
similar scrutiny and potential reversal. EPA modeled the expected effects
of most of such rules, including two of the most prominent rules facing
scrutiny-the Mercury Air Toxics Standards (MATS) 25 2 and the CrossState Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR).253 According to EPA models, MATS,
if it remains in force, will prevent between 4,200 and 11,000 premature
deaths.254 It necessarily follows that EPA consequently knows that a
repeal of MATS will end at least 4,200 lives yearly. Similarly, albeit on a
smaller scale, EPA projects that CSAPR will prevent up to 60 premature
deaths every year. 2 5 5 Thus, for each year that EPA delays or rescinds its

249. See id. at 48,038-43.
250. See id. at 48,037.
251. The potential defense of "superior orders" (i.e., that EPA was just following the
orders of the President and, therefore, not independently culpable) should not apply here.
It is relatively well known and reported in the news media that EPA Administrator Scott
Pruitt has been responsible for the major decisions of the Agency. See, e.g., Coral
Davenport & Eric Lipton, Staff Tells of Rampant Secrecy at Pruitt'sE.P.A., N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 12, 2017, at Al.
252. 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.5480-5610 (2017).
253. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.01-.2922, 78.1-20, 97.1-.935.
254. Mercury and Air Toxics Standard: Heathier Americans, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/mats/healthier-americans (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
255. FACT SHEET: Final Cross-State Air Pollution Rule Update for the 2008
NAAQS, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201706/documents/final finalcsaprur factsheet.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2017).
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implementation, the Agency knows that its actions will end as many as
60 lives yearly.
If EPA proposes to do away with either, or both, of these rules, it
will undoubtedly face political and legal opposition from elected
representatives, non-profit organizations, and even private citizens. The
prospect of criminal prosecution may act as another lever of influence. If
EPA does elect to rescind MATS and/or CSAPR without implementing
adequate replacement regulation, criminal prosecution provides an
effective punishment and deterrence option. Criminal prosecution is an
option that neither the fora of political debate nor civil courtroom
proceedings can match in effectiveness on those two objectives.
C. Flint Water Supply
As told in some detail above,256 the story of Flint's water crisis is
one of knowing government inaction of epic and disastrous proportions.
It has prompted the first significant prosecution similar to the type
theorized herein, with the only real difference being that the defendants
are individual officials rather than government entities. The theory of
that manslaughter case is essentially equivalent to what is suggested for
the potential climate change and air regulations cases just discussedregulators knew that lives would be lost if people faced. exposure to a
particular pollutant, knew that the exposure was almost certainly
occurring through a particular pathway, and yet did nothing to prevent it.
The information available to the charged Flint officials abounded and
included such things as complaints from residents about the color, odor,
and taste of the water; 25 7 scientific studies of the water and of residents'
health;25 8 and the suggested preventative measure and its cost. 25 9 Based
on that information, the officials allegedly knew that deaths would result
and thus committed manslaughter by not acting. If convicted, the Flint
case will set the precedent necessary to pursue other government officials
and entities who knowingly select policies that will result in death when
real alternative options exist.
VII. CONCLUSION

The moral implications of how we, as a society, manage the
environment and natural resources have long been debated, but their
existence has been widely acknowledged. The same cannot be said for
the legal counterpart to those questions of morality-the criminal law as
256.

257.
258.
259.

See supra Section III.D.
See TODD FLOOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 5-8.

See id.
See Buford, supra note 155.
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applied to decisions about the environment. It is no longer tenable to
ignore the criminal implications of environmental policy decisions.
Government entities responsible for such decisions are not meaningfully
different from corporate entities found criminally responsible in other
contexts. The law of criminal intent recognizes that such entities can act
knowingly. Thanks to improvements in science and technology, what is
known by a decision-making entity frequently includes the number of
human lives that will be lost as a result of various policy options.
Prosecutors and administrators are beginning to confront this reality, but
can, and must, do more. If they act appropriately, the criminal law will
provide a valuable tool for improving environmental policy.

